

REGIME CHANGE AND REGIME MAINTENANCE
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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**Democratizing China and Taiwan:
Cultural and Institutional Paradigms**

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In recent years there have been some dramatic changes of political leadership in the Asia–Pacific region, and also some drama without leadership change. In a few countries the demise of well-entrenched political leaders appears imminent; in others regular processes of parliamentary government still prevail. These differing patterns of regime change and regime maintenance raise fundamental questions about the nature of political systems in the region. Specifically, how have some political leaders or leadership groups been able to stay in power for relatively long periods and why have they eventually been displaced? What are the factors associated with the stability or instability of political regimes? What happens when longstanding leaderships change?

The Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific Project will address these and other questions from an Asia–Pacific regional perspective and at a broader theoretical level.

The project is under the joint direction of Dr R.J. May and Dr Harold Crouch.

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DEMOCRATIZING CHINA AND TAIWAN: CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS*

C.L. Chiou

Introduction

Maoist militant revolution died with Mao on 9 September 1976. Deng Xiaoping's political reform, in spite of the great expectations it raised by the 1979–89 modernization push, met an equally tragic death on 4 June 1989, when he sent in his tanks to crush the peaceful pro-democracy demonstration in Tiananmen Square. Before 3 June no one foresaw that the 1989 pro-democracy movement would end up more disastrously than its equally famous forerunner, the May 4 Movement, exactly seventy years earlier in 1919. Of course, there are many differences between the two movements, but there are also many fundamental similarities. The most salient and remarkable similarity between the two historic events, which should cause the most soul-searching among the Chinese people, particularly the intellectuals, is the tragic, almost fatalistic, way the intellectuals' attempts at democratizing China met a tragic fate at the hands of the similar traditional Chinese authoritarian political despots. In terms of democratization, which was the principal modernization goal of the May 4 Movement, the Chinese reformist elites, both cultural and political, achieved very little in their seventy-year long and painful struggles.

On the other hand, on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the defeated Nationalist government, with the same, if not greater, traditional Chinese authoritarianism, oriental despotism, on their back and led by Mao's and Deng's two contemporaries, the two Chiangs, by the time the son, Chiang Ching-kuo, died on 13 January 1988, had not only made an impressive economic miracle,

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For reasons of familiarity and practicality, names from China will be transliterated in *pinyin* and those from Taiwan in Wade-Giles throughout the paper.

but guided Taiwan toward a democratization process that seemed to be working and succeeding. Though it has not yet succeeded, it certainly has reached a point of no return.

Why is it that two oriental despotisms, two traditional Chinese authoritarian political systems—the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan — with so many cultural similarities, started at more or less the same historic point in 1949 but have gone down such different paths and ended up seemingly at different ends of the political spectrum? In the last decade of the twentieth century, China is as authoritarian as ever whilst Taiwan is rapidly becoming a democratized polity. The simplest and most obvious answer is that the former has been a communist while the latter a capitalist society. Standing at the momentous watershed when communist governments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have collapsed and disintegrated like a house of cards, that is an attractive answer. However, it is clearly too simplistic and can only partially answer the question. The long capitalist Republican period, from 1911 to 1949, did not really see much hope for democracy in China. During the 1940s, with Shanghai-style capitalism dominating the Republic's industry, commerce, finance, and other economic fields, China became even more despotic and authoritarian.

Most democracies have been created by elites. People's and Maoist mass-line revolutions are attractive as revolutionary concepts but rarely work in reality, even less in bringing about a functional-institutional democracy. In China and Taiwan in the last four decades, most revolutionary actions, particularly the pro-democracy movements, were initiated and carried out mainly by the intellectual political elite, following almost exactly the 2,000-year Confucian scholar-official tradition. This study tries to answer the question of why democracy is emerging in Taiwan but not China, and to do so from the perspectives and behavioural patterns of the Chinese and Taiwanese cultural-political elites. In short, the question it tries to answer is: 'Why has the Chinese intellectual political elite failed while its Taiwanese counterpart succeeded in democratizing their respective countries?'

The central theoretical framework for this study is the concept of 'democratic method', of democratization technique, based on Joseph A. Schumpeter's classic *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. According to Schumpeter, the

eighteenth-century classical doctrine of democracy could be defined as ‘the democratic method’, that is,

...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the elections of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will (Schumpeter 1942:250).

The Common Good and the Will of the People are the central focus of this theory. They have, however, attracted a great deal of criticism ever since the mid-nineteenth century when rationality in human nature was questioned and the theory of utilitarian rationalism discredited. Schumpeter (*ibid.*:269) thus presents ‘another theory of democracy’ which he believes is ‘much truer to life and at the same time salvages much of what sponsors of democratic method really mean by this term’.

Schumpeter (*ibid.*:269) defines and explains his ‘another theory of democracy’ in the following terms:

It will be remembered that our chief troubles about the classical theory centered in the proposition that ‘the people’ hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion—in a democracy—by choosing ‘representatives’ who will see to it that that opinion is carried out. Thus the selection of representatives is made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate. Suppose we reverse the roles of those two elements and make the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding. To put it differently, we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.

A fair and open institutional arrangement for competitive struggle for political leadership is the methodological foundation of a functional democracy. In this democratic methodology, freedoms of expression and of the press, two- or multi-party systems, and free, fair, and open elections are the essential component parts. Without them, the democratic institutional arrangement cannot be achieved.

China: The May 4 Movement

In the last seventy years, in China as well as in the West, many theoretical treatises have been written as to why 'Mr. D (Democracy)' of the May 4 Movement has failed to arrive and make his presence felt in the Central Kingdom. Among the various theories on offer, the two most persuasive are the economic and the cultural deterministic arguments. Economists stress that, in Western experience, capitalism and democracy have developed hand in hand; without industrialization and high economic development there would have been no democratic political development and China simply has been too poor. With its per capita GDP in 1991 still just about \$US300, measured against the scale of Walt Rostow's (1962) economic growth-based developmental theory, China just has not been, and is still not, in a position to become democratic.

This economic argument has been used often by the Chinese ruling autocracy against rapid democratization. The argument in China has never reached the level of sophistication of the Austrian school of Ludwig von Mises and Friederich Hayek, the Chicago school led by Milton Friedman, or the recent neoconservative thought of Robert Nozick (1974) and Irving Kristol (1983). Nevertheless, it has been just as effective. Even as late as 1989, on the eve of the June 4 incident, the neo-authoritarian advocates argued for the application of the Huntingtonian model of social order and political stability in totalitarian China, to create an 'enlightened' neo-authoritarian political leadership to push strongly for economic reform and modernization (Liu and Liu:1989). And, in their neo-authoritarian eyes, only after a market economy is firmly and highly developed, rapid economic growth is under way, and a strong middle class has been created, can cultural pluralism and political democratization evolve (Petracca and Xiong 1990).

This economic determinist developmental theory is difficult to refute but certainly far from infallible. A less vulnerable sub-theory would be that a stable democracy requires high economic growth, while low economic development makes democratization more difficult and democracy less secure and stable.

Since 1970, New York's Freedom House has put out a Comparative Survey of Freedom (democracy) on the world's nation-states, more than 160 in 1990 and more than 180 in 1992. The main standard it uses to judge freedom and democracy is rather simplistic: while it accepts that democracy is not static and must adjust to changing conditions, it considers that 'at minimum, a democracy

is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not chosen by the government'. Its checklist consists of political rights and civil liberties; on the former, it asks whether the head of state and the legislative representatives are elected through free and fair elections and whether, once elected, they have genuine power; the latter is concerned with freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state.

With this set of simple criteria, of 164 countries in 1990 Freedom House listed: 49 as 'not free', 50 as 'partly free', and 65 as 'free' and democratic (Cohen 1991:21–22). Among the 65 'free' states, there were more than thirty poor, underdeveloped, or developing countries in the world, including Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Namibia, Solomon Islands, and Uruguay. Although not all were stable democracies — Thailand in 1990 was deemed a free democracy but in early 1991 was upset by its latest military coup and then in 1992 regained its good democratic standing — they were nevertheless free and democratic. Even Pakistan, one of the poorest nations in the world, in spite of its status as a 'partly free' state in 1990, had a democratic election in 1989 in which a military-supported authoritarian regime was rejected by the voters. All in all, the list makes a strong case against the Rostowian theory of development and democratization.

The second culturalist, developmental theory is more difficult to assess objectively. With a 2,000-year Confucian cultural tradition, the argument is, the traditional authoritarian culture in China has constituted such a heavy burden, and left such a deep imprint on the psycho-cultural structure of the Chinese people that to destroy 'Confucian shop', as the slogan of the May 4 Movement advocated, and to cultivate new, modern, Western democratic attitudes, values and belief systems is, if not impossible, certainly very difficult. That is a powerful culturalist argument. From Karl Marx's concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production', Max Weber's 'familistic state', and Karl Wittfogel's 'oriental despotism', to Lucien Pye's paternalistic authoritarian political culture (Fairbank 1979:24–29; Pye 1985:1–30), Western sinologists have built up a wealth of impressive literature in support of culturalist developmental theory. They have had an immense impact on the political and intellectual elites, from Hu Shih, Chen Duxiu, and their May 4 generation to the 'River Elegy' (*He Shang*) and neo-authoritarianist reformers, and to the June 4 Tiananmen pro-democracy generation as well.

Lucien Pye (*ibid.*:61) puts it simply:

Confucianism upheld the ideal that rulers should be exemplary people who possessed greater skills and talents than those they ruled. Out of this belief in rule by the elite grew an imperial bureaucratic system that was one of the great achievements in human history.

He then proceeds to point out that

...the basic sociological and psychological patterns of Chinese culture also emphasized stability and order over action and achievement. One of the most extraordinary features of Confucianism was the way in which it elevated government and family to be the two key institutions of society, with each reinforcing the other....Thus Confucianism explicitly directed that children should be taught to have proper respect for all forms of authority (*ibid.*).

Shaped by this total ideology, the Chinese have always made their leaders into larger-than-life figures; they have looked for wise, virtuous, and strong leaders to lead them and to solve problems for them. In contemporary China, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, just like their ancient predecessors, Han Gaozu and Tang Taizhong, were regarded by their subjects as 'sons of heaven' — *tian zong ying ming* (enlightened leaders from heaven).

The second important cultural influence is that the Chinese have generally internalized the conviction that all power should reside in a central authority. That conviction,

...has been one of the most powerful factors in shaping Chinese history. It has preserved a unitary political system in China, and it has made the Chinese uneasy whenever their cultural world has been sundered by contending political authorities (*ibid.*:184).

Of course even a convinced culturalist like Pye does not agree with the argument of the 'mechanistic culturalists', that, under the straitjacket of Confucian oriental despotism, East Asians in general and the Chinese in particular could not modernize and democratize their countries. As Pye (*ibid.*:55) put it, that the Confucian tradition presents no barriers to modernization is indicated by the striking successes of Japan, followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all model examples of 'newly-industrializing nations'. More importantly, by 1990, Japan and South Korea had already become

functional democracies and Singapore and Taiwan, in spite of some apparent defects, were on the verge of institutional democratization.

The inevitable question must then be why not China? In his study of Asian political development, dealing with the relationship between the distinctive political cultures of each Asian society and the policy choices of their respective leaders in seeking modernization, Pye (*ibid.*:29) explains:

On this matter there are two diametrically opposed views: one holds that the policies of governments tend in the main to reflect the characteristics and predispositions of their cultures; the other is that leaders can be either wise or foolish in using features of their nation's culture in their strategies of modernization. The first view is highly deterministic and presupposes that policy choices are essentially dictated by cultural predispositions, while the second suggests that there is scope for rational choice, and room for accidents, and therefore the test of government is how skilful leaders are in taking advantage of, and avoiding the obstacles inherent in, the basic characteristics of their national cultures.

He indicates that, on balance, his study will be tilted toward the second. This paper, on the other hand, will try to demonstrate that in the Chinese case the former seems to explain better China's developmental approach and experience in the past seventy years, whilst in the Taiwanese case the latter seems to fit better the way the political elite has dealt with its democratization problems for the past forty years.

For Chinese intellectuals, the May 4 Movement started the real, intensive and extensive push for Westernization, democratization, and modernization in China. Motivated by furious anti-foreignism and the strong new nationalism, students and scholars from Beijing, Qinghua, and other universities, led by Chen Duxiu, Hu Shih, Li Dazhao, Cai Yuanpei, Lu Xun and others, tried to destroy once and for all the Confucian old China and to create an industrialized, Westernized, modernized, and democratized new China. Their catch-cries were 'Mr S (Science)' and 'Mr D'. However, the May 4 Movement was much more a 'New Culture', 'New Literature', or new enlightenment movement than it was a democracy movement.

Moreover, the 'Mr D' of the May 4 generation was much more a cultural democracy than an institutional democracy. What the May 4 intellectuals proposed was to cultivate, educate, and socialize the Chinese people with new democratic culture, attitudes, beliefs, and values, rather than to revolutionize the

traditional authoritarian Confucian political system by establishing new democratic, rational, legal, and institutional political structures.

From the beginning, many intellectuals, including the liberal Westernizers led by Hu Shih, the radicals or 'leftists' led by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and the reformists in between led by Liang Qichao, were reluctant to become involved in political affairs, or even to talk politics. As Chow (1960:222) points out, 'This was true even in the case of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu), who was so much disappointed by warlordism and the old bureaucracy that he thought at this time the hope of saving China lay not in political action but in a cultural renovation of the entire nation'.

On the other end of the continuum, the liberals' abhorrence of practical politics was based 'on the one hand upon their pessimistic views of the warlord and bureaucratic government, and on the other upon their assumption that political reforms could be achieved only after a social and cultural transformation which must be promoted by way of education' (*ibid.*:223). In the middle, Liang Qichao and his supporters in the *Jinpu dang* (Progressive Party), whilst appreciating the importance of 'political movement' but not institutional democratization, were still very much constrained by culturalist determinism. Liang realized that to nurture a political movement in a country without freedom of speech and assembly and among a people largely illiterate would involve the danger that the movement might be manipulated by politicians and political parties for their own ends. He believed the majority of the people would not be interested in politics; 'or if they did join it, it would be dominated by mob emotion and not by rational considerations'. For these reasons, he thought, 'it seemed better to build first a foundation for future political reform by way of a cultural movement or of an economic and social reform movement' (*ibid.*:226-27). John K. Fairbank (1979:232-33) puts it simply:

The scholars of this revolutionary generation debated and discussed the application of Western ideas to China's ancient culture. Hu Shih stood for critical attitude toward all things and the necessity of persistent, long-term efforts to change Chinese thinking bit by bit, solving problems, not marching to slogans. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in the name of human rights and social equality, attacked Confucianism. Like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, these scholars pointed the way toward an ethical revolution at the very roots of China's ancient society.

In terms of institutional democratization, both Sun Yat-sen and Chen Duxiu had missed an opportunity to establish a meaningful two-party democratic political system in China in the early 1920s, before Sun's death in 1925. Instead, they wanted the two parties to merge into one. But by the time Chiang's militarist forces got the support of some liberals, achieved control of the Kuomintang (KMT), began his Northern Expedition, and purged the Communists in Shanghai in 1926, it was too late for either Liang Qichao's or Chen Duxiu's intellectual followers to start any functional-institutional democratization process in China. This was a great pity, for when a meaningful, democratic (two-)party system failed to materialize, the earlier appearance of democratic local elections (impressively researched and documented by Fincher 1981) became meaningless.

Because of that failure, over the next two decades Chiang Kai-shek with his KMT and Mao Zedong with his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became more and more like Han Gaozu, Tang Taizhong, Ming Taizu, and other dynastic founders, whose struggle was to overthrow the previous dynasty and annihilate any political opponents, to create their own 'mandate of heaven' and to establish their own 'Middle Kingdom'. In a fundamental Confucian Chinese way, there was no room for democratic party politics in their psycho-cultural frame of mind. Between Chiang and Mao there could only be one 'son of heaven'; one of them had to be proven to be only a pretender and eliminated. When Chiang was militarily and politically more powerful in the 1930s, he would not tolerate Mao and wanted intensely to get rid of Mao and his Communists before he would fight the invading Japanese. In the late 1940s, when the tables had turned and both militarily and politically Mao had become more powerful, he would not tolerate Chiang and his Nationalists either. In the Confucian heaven, there just could not be two suns. Although some 'third force' independent intellectuals did try to mediate and talk Chiang and Mao into accepting each other, their efforts were futile. The 'court scholars' on both sides, on the other hand, were too busy trying to justify and rationalize either the Nationalist or the Communist ideology and 'mandate of heaven' so that very little, if anything at all, of institutional democracy was on their minds. Even less was it seen and advocated as a viable alternative to, a solution of, China's civil war and internecine political struggles.

Most liberal intellectuals supported the new central polity in Nanking set up by Chiang Kai-shek, hoping that the new Nationalist government would unify China and strengthen it to meet the emerging militarist threat from Japan. During the ten-year Republican period (1927–37), Chen Duxiu was expelled from the CCP and Li Dazhao died in 1927. Other radical leftists spent their lives aimlessly in Shanghai's foreign concessions in the early 1930s, and then made the clandestine trip to Yanan to join Mao's Communist revolution after the historic Long March in the late 1930s; the liberals withdrew even further into their futile 'cultural renaissance' wilderness, failing totally not only in their new cultural movement but even more in their hope of bringing liberal democracy to China.

In the end, the liberals, led by Hu Shih, Luo Longji, Ting Wenjiang, Fu Sinian, Zhang Boling, and Jiang Mengling — most of them famous professors of Beijing University who had been involved in the May 4 Movement — went as far as to vow to abstain from any further engagements in political activity and to concentrate on scientific and educational tasks instead (Halbeisen 1988:1). At the time, very little common understanding could be found among the liberal intellectuals concerning the role and importance of political parties, and most were barely willing to concede that parties might have some useful functions. The liberal intellectuals as a group had only very hazy ideas about the working and the structures of different forms of government. Although they were in favour of democracy, very little attention was given to explaining its characteristics and procedures.

Lloyd E. Eastman (1974) reaches basically the same conclusion; he refers to the attempts of Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT and Hu Shih and his liberal intellectuals to modernize China as an 'abortive revolution'.

Qu Yuan and Chinese remonstrators

Qu Yuan was born in 343 BC, during the period of the Warring States. He was an official of the state of Chu, one of the major kingdoms of the period. The state of Qin sent Zhang I as an emissary to persuade King Huai of Chu to cut ties with the state of Qi. If King Huai accepted the proposal, Qin would give Chu 600 *Li* of land around the place called Shang Yu. It was a Qin plot to divide and eventually conquer Chu and Qi. Qu Yuan pleaded with the king not to go ahead with the deal. King Huai ignored his plea and severed relations with Qi. Afterwards, when

Chu demanded Qin fulfil its promise, Qin refused. Chu sent troops to attack Qin but was defeated by the combined forces of Qin and Qi.

Later when Zhang I and other court officials of Chu tried to arrange a meeting between the kings of Chu and Qin to settle their differences, Qu Yuan again saw the sinister nature of the arrangement and remonstrated against the planned meeting. His advice was again ignored. King Huai went to the meeting and was forced by Qin to sign an 'unequal treaty' to cede his land to Qin. King Huai was taken prison and later died in Qin.

King Huai's son, Qing Xiang, was also surrounded by disloyal and corrupt officials and was very irresponsible in dealing with state affairs. Qu Yuan continued to remonstrate and urged the new king to introduce reforms and take good care of the people. The king treated Qu's advice as a nuisance and irritation, and had him exiled to a remote region in southern China. For years Qu Yuan wrote poems to express his worries and concerns about the future of his kingdom. One of his poems is the immortal *Li Shao*. When he heard the news that the capital of Chu had fallen and his people had been massacred, he was so saddened that he drowned himself in the Mi Lo River on the fifth day of the fifth month of the Chinese lunar year, in 278 BC.

Qu Yuan has since become the most revered Confucian scholar-remonstrator in Chinese history. The day of his drowning has become the famous Dragon Boat Festival, one of the most celebrated festivals of Chinese life for more than two thousand years.

What the intellectuals did during the twenty-seven-year rule of Mao had nothing to do with culturalist, even less with institutionalist, democratization of China. Even after having been treated by the Maoist red guards in the most inhuman and humiliating way, intellectuals like Liu Binyan, Fei Xiaotong, Ba Jin, Ding Ling, Zhou Yang, and others, continued to express their 'second kind of loyalty' to Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and their Communist Party. Lao She, the most respected literary giant in the post-Lu Xun China, was already more than eighty years old when he was brutally persecuted by the red guards during the Cultural Revolution. When he jumped into a lake in a Beijing suburb in 1968 and drowned himself, just like Qu Yuan more than 2,000 years before, he was reported to have said: 'The Party understands me'.

Liu Binyan's *Di Er Zhong Zhongcheng* (The Second Kind of Loyalty), which was originally published in the *Fazhi Wenxue* (Legalist Literature, May

1985), was a unique piece of contemporary Chinese literature. As the most famous and influential of investigative reporters, he had suffered numerous bitter purges, particularly during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and had been twice expelled from the party; his long unwavering faith in Marxist ideology, the communist revolution, Mao, and the CCP can be understood only in the context of traditional feudalistic paternalistic Confucian social and human relationships. Liu Binyan concluded his report by saying:

Both Chen Shizhong and Ni Yuxian have suffered a great deal and paid a heavy price for their political struggles. They almost lost their lives. But neither did they withdraw and become passive, nor did they become bitter and hateful because of the wrongs done to them. On the contrary, "even after nine deaths, they do not regret." They continue to put aside their personal losses and faithfully maintain their support of the party line set down by the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee. They continue to offer their lives for the four modernizations and the reforms.

Andrew J. Nathan (1985:25) also explains Liu's 'second kind of loyalty' in terms of Qu Yuan's remonstrance tradition. In 1988, after being expelled from the CCP and helped by Harrison Salisbury, Liu Binyan was given permission to leave for a lecture tour in the United States. Even then he did not find the West appealing. Liu (1990:227) preferred to 'spend two years in some remote area of China, perhaps right in the heart of Daxinganling, for during the past few years, I had spent so little time at the grass-roots level'. He believed that 'it was at that level that all the momentous changes taking place in China were most forcefully reflected, changes that were of historical significance, since they concerned the fate of one billion people'.

Even in mid 1992, on the eve of the pending integration of two major Chinese pro-democracy organizations in the West —the Alliance for Democracy in China (New York) and the Federation for a Democratic China (Paris)—when Liu Binyan was urged to lead the new movement which supporters hoped would eventually evolve into a political party to challenge the CCP one-party dictatorship, he again rejected the call (interview with Yan Jiaqi, Paris, June 1992).

When Liu Binyan was an investigative reporter for the *People's Daily*, Wang Ruoshui was the newspaper's deputy chief editor. Wang (1986) wrote his celebrated article on 'Defence of Humanism' in 1983, causing Deng Xiaoping,

Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and other Maoist ideologists to react violently, calling for Wang's expulsion from the CCP and starting an anti-intellectual 'spiritual-pollution' campaign. All that Wang had done was try to explain that humanism is not the exclusive property of bourgeois capitalist society, that Marx was a humanist, and that socialism needs humanism. Liu Binyan, together with Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang, another famous dissident, were expelled from the party in early 1987, while Wang Ruoshui was 'persuaded' to quit the party in August 1987. They were accused of spreading 'spiritual pollution' and creating 'bourgeois liberalization'.

Both Liu Binyan and Wang Ruoshui joined the CCP in the 1940s and had been faithful Marxist-Maoists even since, in spite of having gone through the painful purges in the Anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, based at the *People's Daily*, they emerged to become two of the most influential reformist intellectuals in China. They suffered purges again in 1983 and 1987. Still they supported the 1989 pro-democracy movement, even though they did not really understand the West and Western democracy. They tried to be modern Qu Yuans, pushing the CCP into reform and China into modernity. But their 'second kind of loyalty' invariably prevented them from going further than attempting to reform and democratize the party from within. They were doomed to failure.

In a series of lectures at Beijing, Jiaotong, Tongji, Zhoujiang, and other universities in late 1986, Fang Lizhi, then vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology and a world-renown astrophysicist, suddenly emerged from obscurity to become 'China's Sakharov', the leading democracy fighter in China. The messages of Fang's speeches were simple and straightforward, powerful but sometimes demagogic. In 1987 he talked about knowledge being higher than authority, of intellectuals as the vanguard of the society, and said that China was still a feudalist society. He said that from Marx to Mao socialism had failed, the 'four cardinal principles' should not be a superstitious, authoritarian, or conservative ideology, and the CCP should be reformed. He stressed that China needed pluralism, and democracy would not be handed down from above. He believed modernization was more than just economic development, and that democracy had to be based on human rights and had to start from the individual. He explained that democracy was a political system of separation of powers, and checks and balances. His strongest

condemnation was directed at the corruption and special privileges of the party cadres and government officials, and he expressed anger at the soaring prices and poor living standard of the people. He called on Deng Xiaoping to be 'China's George Washington'.

In mid 1986 it became clear to the reformists that their economic-cultural-political reforms had reached a dead end. They, particularly the radical reformers, were increasingly frustrated, and began to call for more radical political structural reform. According to Harding (1987:151–52), the radical leaders reinserted the question of political reform into the Chinese political agenda for three reasons. For one, they wanted to sustain the momentum of their broader reform programme at a time when economic reform seemed to be faltering. Secondly, the radical reformers had concluded that increasing economic efficiency and productivity would require a new wave of even more far-reaching economic reforms, including the extension of the marketplace to govern an increasing number of economic activities, the growth of private entrepreneurship, and changes in the structure of state ownership of industry. If these economic reforms were to be seriously considered, let alone adopted, there would need to be widespread agreement to reduce further the ideological constraints on the formulation of economic policy. Finally, many of the radical reformers believed that a new round of political reforms was necessary as an end in itself, to restore the confidence of the Chinese people in their government.

At a more realistic structural-functional level, Yan Jiaqi, then the director of the Institute of Political Science in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and one of Premier Zhao Ziyang's reformist advisors, and his colleagues in the CCP inner circle of political structural reform, wanted certain local-level institutional democratization experiments. These have been described by Harding (*ibid.*:196). The Party never systematically spelled out what it meant by the development of 'socialist democracy', but the term was apparently meant to include measures to increase the degree of legislative oversight of administrative officials and the establishment of mechanisms to increase the accountability of both legislators and administrators to their constituents, the people. Experiments with political reform were launched in three coastal cities that, over time, developed close ties with the radical reformers. In the Shekou Industrial Area, part of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone near Hong Kong, a management committee was chosen through direct election and was subjected

to annual votes of confidence by staff and workers. In the Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Zone officials were subject to recall by voters. In Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang, the Communist Youth League conducted experiments in which its officers were elected through more democratic procedures.

The experiments in Shekou, Tianjin, and Wenzhou, which Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, and other radical reformists visited, were exciting and widely discussed.¹ Although small in scale and limited in nature, they were useful attempts at democratization, and acted as catalysts on the Dengist political structural reform programme. Nevertheless, they were carefully controlled and in the end failed to have the snowballing effect some radical reformists had hoped for. The party conservatives, led by the powerful Long March revolutionary, Chen Yun, one of Deng's contemporaries, were vigorously against them. Chen insisted that these 'small bird cages' of reform had to be confined strictly within the 'large bird cage' of socialism.

Many intellectuals, even pro-reformists, had doubts. They still believed that pluralism might promote chaos and in accordance with Chinese political culture that a more unitary form of politics was necessary to ensure unity and harmony. A senior intellectual even asked: 'What good would there be in having opposition parties here? What the Chinese people want is common goals' (Harding 1987:201). Clearly, although many of them claimed to be supporters of democracy, these intellectuals did not really understand the fundamental principles, still less the detailed structure and function, of a democratic socio-political system.

A number of reformist ideas, such as systems of rotation, fixed terms and mandatory retirement for top party, military, and government leaders, and competitive elections at the people's and party congresses — ideas cherished and advocated by Yan Jiaqi — did receive Zhao Ziyang's approval and were partially implemented. The suggestion of Yan Jiaqi and Fei Xiaotong, China's foremost sociologist, that the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (the largest united front organization in China) could be made into an upper house or senate, did not go very far but attracted some interest. Still, the institutionalization of political structural reform was piecemeal and fragile.

The dismissal of Hu Yaobang in early 1987 illustrated dramatically the limits to political institutionalization in post-Mao China. The confrontation

between Hu and the party veterans revealed the absence of clear, accepted norms defining the authority of the general secretary, specifying the power of senior party cadres who had retired into advisory positions, establishing terms of office for high party officials, or providing for the removal of a general secretary when he had lost the confidence of most of the politburo. The removal of Hu Yaobang also illustrated how much the Chinese political system centred around the personal authority of Deng Xiaoping. Although Deng had withdrawn from active involvement in the details of policy making in China, he remained the final source of authority in Chinese politics, the one who made or approved the most important decisions on policy and personnel.

During the 'hundred flowers' liberalization period of 1987–88 Chinese intellectuals had a better time. For once they were a bit more than just traditional scholar remonstrators and some such as Yan Jiaqi, Chen Yizi, Zhao Fusan, and even the Marxist scholar Su Shaozhi, were actively involved in Zhao Ziyang's structural reformist decision-making process.²

Having already served as the founding director of the CASS's new Institution of Political Science for a few years, by 1986 Yan Jiaqi had become one of the most influential political scientists in China. His book, *Wen Hua Da Ge Ming Shi Nien Shi* (Ten-year History of the Great Cultural Revolution), co-authored with his wife Gao Gao, had just come off the press and created a political-cultural storm in China, and his new book on heads of state and government, *Shou Nao Lun* (On Heads of State and Government), had also just been released and had become a best seller overnight. In late November, in two in-depth interviews, he explained his master plan of political reform. He was very impressive. More importantly, at the time he was deeply involved in the work of Zhao Ziyang's political structural reform programmes.

Although Yan's constitutional-institutional reformist approach toward separation of powers, checks and balances, fixed tenure for the head of government, and so on, was clear and firm, he avoided dealing with power and authority questions in socialist-communist countries. Moreover he did not directly raise the issues of the election of the head by the people and the role and function of the two- or multi-party system in elections. There was no real institutional arrangement for competitive struggle for political leadership in his reformist paradigm.

By October 1988 Yan Jiaqi had become internationally very well known and was invited to give lectures and attend conferences all over the world. He

had also just refused to serve a third term as the director of the Institute of Political Science, in spite of the overwhelming vote he received in the institute's election. More importantly, some of his moderate reformist proposals had been implemented by Zhao Ziyang. Undoubtedly he was a rising political star. He was still moderate, optimistic, and full of praise for and confidence in Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. He condemned the neo-authoritarianism that was going around, and was well aware of the difficulties of dividing power between the party and the state, and between the party and enterprises; he even said that he saw no major advancement in democratizing the organizations of the CCP and the government of the PRC. He continued to stress patience and urge a long-term evolutionary view, and was unwilling to push for more substantial democratization measures. Meanwhile he had further refined his moderate structural reform proposals, such as that to change the standing committee of the National People's Congress into a full-time professional legislative-judicial state organ. The only new idea he advanced was a substantial amendment to the state constitution to make it the real legal source of the highest state authority, eliminating the CCP as the 'government above government', the 'authority above authority'. He had no specific and workable ideas and agenda on how to do it, however. To him, it was still a question of the separation of the powers, structure, and functions of two intrinsically contradictory political institutions. He mentioned constitutional reform, but when asked about the inconsistency between democracy and Deng's 'four cardinal principles' and about the need to guarantee real democratic opposition parties in the state constitution, he painfully avoided the issue (Chiou 1989:232-36).

In late 1988 it seemed Yan Jiaqi had lagged behind the tide of change that was sweeping the Chinese mainland, and was unable to break out of the authoritarian constraints of the dictatorship of the CCP. His political structural reform would not really work and he did not really understand the fundamental nature of institutional democracy. He understood and appreciated much better than most other Chinese intellectuals the necessity for institutionalization of political reform, but he failed to see the inevitable need for democratic institutions, such as a two- or multi-party system and truly open, fair, and competitive elections for not only the legislative but also the executive branches of government, to achieve real constitutional-institutional democratization. His advocacy of making the National People's Congress effective both as a legislative and a judicial body were naive and simplistic. Such a course would not

work in socialist China. Moreover, it was both in theory and in practice inferior (not superior, as he claimed) to the rigid and rigorous separation of the legislative and judicial branches of government in the West.

Among other Chinese intellectuals in the reformist years of 1979–89, Su Shaozhi substantially dismantled the myth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought as a political ideology and provided Deng Xiaoping with a flexible new socialist theory of the theory of ‘primary stage of socialism’. But while he was an impressive intellectual remonstrator, he was never an institutionalist democratizer. Yu Haocheng and Li Hungli, two other prominent reformist intellectuals, were to some extent institutionalists but were actively concerned and involved in words and deeds mainly in Chinese legal structural reform. Among the top Chinese intellectual elite, however, Yan Jiaqi was really the only effective theoretical and practical institutional reformer. Only to a limited extent, however, was Yan an institutionalist democratizer. Under Dengist authoritarianism Yan Jiaqi seemed fated to have no choice but to be another Qu Yuan. As will be further discussed below, it took the Tiananmen massacre to make him denounce the ‘Chinese new emperor’ and see the futility of his limited institutional democratization efforts.

The ‘River Elegy’ and the Tiananmen tragedy

During the 1987–88 reform period, on the cultural front the ‘River Elegy’ controversy created probably the most heated debates and attracted the strongest response from the conservative old guard. Written and produced by six young intellectuals, Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang, and others, and with Bao Zunxin as its chief advisor, the six-episode television series ‘River Elegy’ was broadcast by the Chinese national television network in June 1988. It immediately sparked both popularity and controversy. The ‘River Elegy’ reformists, in powerfully emotional words, called for a total refutation and rejection of traditional conservative authoritarian Chinese culture, represented by the poor and backward Yellow River and its yellow-earth banks, the mythical and superstitious power of the Dragon, the symbol of the Chinese emperor, and the anachronistic Great Wall, which failed miserably to defend China but succeeded in preventing the Chinese from breaking out into the outside world to learn and absorb the modern culture of the West. They echoed the calls for ‘Mr S’ and ‘Mr D’ of the May 4 Movement and advocated complete Westernization of China (Su *et al.*:1988–89).

The first and second episodes of the 'River Elegy' are entitled 'Looking for a Dream' and 'The Fate'. The authors begin by pointing out that Chinese civilization has been in decline for a long time, creating a deeply disturbed and distorted national psycho-culture. The Chinese people still hold their 4,000-year-old dream of being the centre of the world, though in reality the dream ended when the first emperor of the Qing dynasty, Kang Xi, entered the Great Wall and declared it a waste of money and manpower. The episodes explain that the Yellow River, despite its periodical floods, has since the Yao-Shun period (about 2300 BC) tied down the Chinese people along its two yellow-earth banks. The Chinese people's acceptance of this earth-bound fate was reinforced by the Qin Great Wall built by the first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang (246–214 BC), and the Ming Great Wall, built during the Ming dynasty in the fifteenth century. The authors argue that if the Qin wall was a great achievement, showing the vision and strength of the Han civilization, the Ming wall was a failure, only indicating the defeatist mentality of the Chinese people. They ask why it was that in spite of the Great Wall, which was even extended to the East China Sea, the *wei kou* (Japanese) could cross the sea and attack China, while the Chinese people could only defend themselves on the coasts and did not even think about going to the island nation to see for themselves what the *weikou* were doing. The authors assert that the Yellow River, the yellow earth, the Great Wall, and the conservative Confucian ideology were used so effectively by the yellow-robed emperors to control the Chinese people that they just could not break loose to understand the meaning of freedom and to grasp the opportunity to develop trade and other contacts with the outside world. Therein lay the self-imposed isolation and resulting backwardness of Chinese civilization.

The third and fourth episodes deal with the question of why China invented gun powder, the compass, paper making, and printing as early as the eleventh century, but could not further develop its science and technology and was overtaken by the West in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The authors blame the conservative feudalist Chinese culture which, they suggest, made the Chinese peasant population non-innovative, incapable of taking risks, fatalistic in their outlook, and totally dependent on the 'will of heaven'.

The fifth and sixth parts express the authors' thoughts on the future of China. They point out that from 602 BC to 1930 AD the Yellow River had broken its banks and flooded the yellow-earth central plains 1,590 times and changed its course 26 times. They believe the Chinese future lies neither there along the

Yellow River, nor in the yellow earth of the Chinese *da yi tong* (great unitary) Confucian culture. They tell the stories of Bao Gong and Liu Shaoqi. About 800 years ago, Bao Gong was a *Qing Tien* (literally 'blue sky', meaning a clean and just official) in Kaifeng, an old capital city on the Yellow River in Henan. He was a selfless and tireless magistrate who tried to right wrongs for everyone, especially the poor. His legendary deeds became a perfect embodiment of Confucian benevolent scholar-officialdom. After his death, a temple was built to worship him. Not far away from Bao Gong's temple in Kaifeng, there was an old small bank. In 1969, during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the PRC, who had chaired the drafting of the Republic's constitution as well as the CCP constitution, was put under secret house arrest in that dark old bank. After twenty-eight days Liu died. The authors say that when the law could no longer protect the common citizens, it would not, in the end, be able to protect the chairman of the People's Republic. If Chinese society was not reformed, if Chinese economic, political, and cultural systems were not modernized, national tragedies, incidents such as the persecution of the PRC chairman, would be repeated time and time again.

The authors then turn to Chinese intellectuals. They use Yan Fu as an example. The Qing government sent Yan Fu to study the navy in England, but after returning home Yan did not become a warship commander; instead he became a cultural enlightener. When the 100-Day Self-Strengthening Campaign of the Guangxi Emperor which Yan supported failed, the 1886 Meiji Restoration in Japan was succeeding. As this great new-cultural enlightener of modern China came increasingly under attack from traditional feudalistic forces, giving up reformist ideas one by one and finally withdrawing into the arms of Confucianism, his classmate at the British naval academy, Ito Hirobumi, became Japan's prime minister and led the island nation quickly into the ranks of world's big powers. Yan Fu, like Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and other great thinkers of modern China after a period of revolutionary radicalism, inevitably returned to the 2,000-year-old house of Confucius.

The authors complain that the Chinese yellow earth has failed to teach the Chinese people the spirit of science and the harsh Yellow River has never raised the Chinese people's democratic political consciousness. For two thousand years Confucian culture failed to produce a progressive national mentality, a cultural renewal process, or a rational-legal social system. They cite the data of

the massive opinion survey on political culture carried out by the Beijing Institute of Economics, the first private research organization set up by Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, and other young political scientists and economists in 1986, to prove how underdeveloped the Chinese civic culture has been (Ming 1989). They are disappointed with Chinese intellectuals and pin their hope for the future of China on the 'new entrepreneurs', the *ge ti hu* (individual enterprises), and the 'special economic zones' along the newly-opened Chinese coasts. They see China's new future in the blue oceans of the world and new markets overseas. They urge the Chinese people to break out of the bondages of the Yellow River, the yellow-earth Central Kingdom, and the Great Wall.

In spite of its simple message and highly emotional tone, the 'River Elegy' got an immediate, spontaneous, and enthusiastic nationwide response from other young liberal reformists. However, the conservatives were stunned and angered by the extent of the condemnation of traditional Chinese culture and the implicit but clear criticism of the failures of the Maoist and Dengist communist revolution. Wang Zhen, vice-chairman of the PRC and an ultra-conservative, was reportedly so furious that he called the 'Elegy' authors unfilial sons and traitors to the nation. He complained that the 'River Elegy' cursed the Yellow River and the Great Wall and defamed the great Chinese race. He was reported to have said: 'I have struggled for many years so that I could administrate the national affairs. Now I have met these useless professors and graduate students. They have really driven me crazy. I have never been so angry before. The intellectuals are vary dangerous' (*China Spring* 67, December 1989). The programme was denied a rerun and the associated book banned from publication.

In a simplistic yet rather clumsy way, the 'River Elegy' repeated the ideas, slogans, dreams, and hopes of the May 4 Movement, nothing more. As culturalist Tu Wei-ming of Harvard University points out (1991:5-6), in the aftermath of the devastating Cultural Revolution, the Chinese intelligentsia returned to the May 4 Movement's argument that since China's backwardness had deep roots in the Chinese polity, society, and culture, 'a total transformation of Chineseness is a precondition for China's modernization'. For these intellectuals, strategically 'the most painful and yet effective method of this transformation is to invite the modern West with all of its fruitful ambiguities to "decenter" the Chinese mentality'.

The second important intellectual debate in the ten-year reform period was the sudden and forceful appearance of neo-authoritarianism in 1988. Started by a group of young economists and political scientists, including Wu Jiaxiang, Xiao Gongqing, Zhang Binjiu, and Yang Baikui, the neo-authoritarian advocates put up a strong argument for some sort of 'enlightened dictatorship' (Liu and Liu 1989; Petracca and Xiong 1990; Oksenberg *et al.* 1990:123–50). Most of them agreed with the 'River Elegy's' culturalist picture of China. They believed in a massive injection of capitalist market economy into China but did not perceive any possibility of political democratization in China at present or in the near future. They used, or rather misused, Huntington's theory of political change and political decay (Huntington 1968), as well as the developmental experiences of Asia's newly-industrializing countries (NICs) — South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore — to support their argument that China, deeply steeped in traditional authoritarian culture, needed a strong man, a powerful political leader, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, or Lee Kuan Yew. Such a leader would be committed to rapid economic modernization and, more than that, would be able, willing, and ready to apply maximum dictatorial forces, including military ones, to maintain socio-political unity and stability and to mobilize total national resources to attain high economic growth. They believed that 'modernization and democratization are impossible in China, given its past, without a neo-authoritarian regime and period of transition' and that 'neo-authoritarianism is a stage through which China's political development must pass as it moves from totalitarianism to democracy' (Petracca and Xiong 1990:1106–8).

Although he was not openly named, clearly the neo-authoritarianists looked toward Deng Xiaoping and, if not Deng, Zhao Ziyang as their immediate hope for providing such an enlightened dictatorship. Some of them, such as Wu Jiaxiang and Yang Baikui, worked for Zhao's economic structural reform programmes and became part of Zhao's think-tank group. Incredibly, not only did they not blame Mao's authoritarianism for China's serious problems of underdevelopment, they advocated more, not less, authoritarianism to solve those problems. Although they read Samuel Huntington, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Robert Dahl, Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Samuelson, and John Kenneth Galbraith, whose writings became very popular in China in the 1980s, it seems that they never broke out of their iron straitjacket of traditional

Confucian paternalistic authoritarian culture. They were just as much Confucian intellectual remonstrators as Qu Yuan and Sima Guang (Sung dynasty) of imperial China and Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Hu Shih (Chiang Kai-shek's number one intellectual), and Guo Moruo (Mao Zedong's number one intellectual) of modern China. Liang Qichao's 'enlightened despotism' seems to have been the only answer they could come up with to deal with China's perennial modernization difficulties. In essence, their neo-authoritarianism was the same as the old authoritarianism of Confucius, the most eminent *lao fu zi* (old master) of China.

From 15 April 1989 — the death of Hu Yaobang, which triggered the Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations — to 4 June, the students and intellectuals, eventually supported by millions of Chinese people, mounted a peaceful, rational, moderate economic-political reform campaign.³ They asked for basic human rights, freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly, and for democratic political rights to have fair elections and open channels to see, discuss, and participate in government decision-making processes. Their voice, 'cries for democracy', became louder, more intense and desperate as the demonstrations went on during the fifty-day period, echoing the cries for 'Mr S' and 'Mr D' of the May 4 Movement.

Although when the students marched on the Beijing streets they shouted the slogans, 'down with corruption!', 'long live democracy!' and 'long live freedom!', their initial demands to the standing committee of the National People's Congress were:

- reevaluate Hu Yaobang and his achievements;
- renounce the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign and the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign;
- allow citizens to publish non-official newspapers and end censorship of the press;
- reveal the salaries and other wealth of party and government leaders and their families;
- rescind the Beijing municipal government's 'ten provisional regulations' on public marches and demonstrations;

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- increase state expenditure for higher education; and
 - provide objective news coverage of the students' demonstrations.

On 26 April the CCP official press, the *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)* published its first threatening editorial, 'We Must Take a Firm Stand Against Turmoil'. In response, the Provisional Students' Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges released its 'Letter to Compatriots Throughout the Nation', demanding a dialogue with government leaders, an investigation by the minister of public security of the April 20 incident in which students were beaten, and an apology to students from the editor of the *New China News Agency (Xinhua She)* for its distorted reports on the movement. The letter also listed thirteen 'unified slogans', including: (1) Support the Communist Party and Socialism, Support Reform; (2) Long Live Democracy; (3) Oppose Corruption in Government, Oppose Special Privileges; (4) Pledge to Defend the Constitution to Death; and others.

The government consistently ignored student demands that an open dialogue be staged between the authorities and the Beijing Students' Federation (an independent student union), and on 13 May about 2,000 students, under the gentle but charismatic and effective leadership of Cai Ling, began a hunger strike. The hunger strikers asked the government to promptly carry out 'a substantive and concrete dialogue based on the principle of equality of parties' with the Beijing Students' Dialogue Delegation. They also demanded that the government set straight the reputation of the student movement and affirm it as a patriotic student democracy movement.

On 14 May twelve leading intellectuals, including Dai Qing, Yu Haocheng, Li Honglin, Yan Jiaqi, Su Xiaokang, Bao Zunxin, Liu Zaifu, and Li Zehou, urged the CCP to accept the students' demands that the government recognize the student movement as a patriotic democracy movement and recognize the legality of student organizations that had been elected and formed by the majority of students through democratic procedures. They also advised the students that democracy is constructed gradually and cannot be created in one day, that in order to protect the long-term interests of reform they should avoid incidents that would harm their cause, and that in order that the Sino-Soviet summit meeting between Gorbachev and Chinese leaders might proceed smoothly, they should temporarily leave Tiananmen Square. Again, the stu-

dents did not pay enough attention to the advice from their intellectual elders and *jian hao ji shou* (seeing the situation is good, withdraw).

The students did not accept the intellectuals' advice and the first summit meeting between the two communist giants for three decades took place in a most inauspicious political atmosphere. When Gorbachev met Zhao Ziyang on 16 May, it became increasingly clear that the liberal-conservative power struggle in the CCP had reached a decisive point, with Zhao and his liberal reformists on the verge of total collapse. Thus, Zhao's disclosure to Gorbachev, that although Deng Xiaoping had officially retired from all party-government posts in 1987 he was still in charge of all important policy making, was an ominous sign of the fatal event that was to unfold. Under such an omnipotent paternalistic authoritarian political culture, the reformists seemed totally helpless.

On 16 May more than one thousand Beijing intellectuals signed another declaration asking the government to accept the demands of the students. On 17 May Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin, and another ten increasingly alienated and radicalized scholars, clearly in support of Zhao Ziyang, declared:

Up to this time, over seven hundred students have fainted. This is a tragic event that has never before occurred in our history.... We are facing a situation in which, one after another, our motherland's sons and daughters are falling even as their just demands meet with repeated delay.... It is that due to the absolute power enjoyed by a dictator, the government has lost its sense of responsibility and its humanity. Such a government is not truly the government of the Republic — it is a government whose existence is possible only because of the power of a dictator.

They continued:

The Qing Dynasty has already been extinct for 76 years (*sic*). Yet China still has an emperor without a crown, an aged, fatuous dictator. Yesterday afternoon, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang publicly announced that all of China's major policy decisions must be reviewed by this decrepit dictator, who is behind the times.... The Chinese people no longer can wait for the dictator to acknowledge his mistake. Now all depends on the students themselves and on the people themselves. Today, we declare to all of China, to all of the world, that from now on the great fight the students have been waging, their hunger strike of 100 hours, has won a great victory. The students have used their own actions to proclaim that this

student movement is not turmoil but rather a great patriotic democracy movement to bury forever dictatorship and an imperial system.

With this militant announcement, in a serious sense Yan Jiaqi and his fellow intellectuals were no longer just scholar remonstrators. However, neither were they true institutional democratizers, although their harsh words did express strongly their dissatisfaction with the traditional Chinese authoritarian political culture. Probably unwittingly, they were trapped in a sort of 'palace coup' naked power struggle within the party, in which there was little real democratization.

On 17 May Zhao Ziyang was ordered to step down by the CCP Politburo. The next day the new hardline leader, Li Peng, met the students, including Wuer Kaixi, and warned them that all sorts of 'idlers and riff-raff' from many parts of China were descending on Beijing; that Beijing had already fallen into a state of anarchy; and that the government could not sit by and idly watch. On 19 May, on the eve of the imposition of martial law, Zhao Ziyang's liberal reformists attempted for the first time to mobilize the constitutional, and thus institutional, power of the National People's Congress, a power that had never been properly exercised in the past, to step in and solve the worsening crisis. They called on the Congress to convene a special session to dismiss the hawkish premier, Li Peng, and accept the basic demands of the hunger-striking students. The attempt did not get off the ground, but it was worthwhile; it signified at least a belated awareness by some of the intellectuals of the importance of constitutional-institutional power and the process of the People's Congress as the 'highest organ of state power'. Of course, it was wishful thinking; the National People's Congress (or its standing committee) just could not react in such a way.

When martial law was announced on 20 May, the students and intellectuals were stunned and angered as well as bewildered and fearful. Some young staff members from the Chinese People's University in desperation proposed that 'the broad masses of intellectuals unite and withdraw, in groups and stages, from the Communist Party to which we have hitherto dedicated our lives' and that 'our intellectuals build a new organization representing the interests of the people, to be called the Association for the Promotion of the Chinese Democracy Movement'. To quit the party was one of the most drastic actions a CCP member could take. To set up an opposition organization, even if it was not really a political party, would certainly have been regarded as 'anti-party' and 'counter-revolutionary'. The call, however, did not meet with wide enthusiasm and mass support. It was a futile call in Beijing's political wilderness.

The call by some Beijing Students' Federation members for the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun, the head of the state, split the Federation. Others appealed to Deng to 'shoulder a great historical task: to bring about the peaceful resolution of this movement for democracy in this country of ours where real democracy still has not been completely realized'. There were still many students who sincerely hoped that Deng's 'handling of this matter will greatly advance Chinese democratization in a non-violent way', and that Deng 'can once again perform a great deed for the Chinese people, enabling China to soon become a truly democratic, free, prosperous and strong nation'.

With the threat of military action against the students hanging over their heads, radicalized intellectuals, such as Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin, and Su Xiaokang, could only make a Qu Yuan-style vow:

As intellectuals, we solemnly swear on our honour, on our entire conscience, on our bodies and souls, on every shred of our dignity as human beings: we shall never betray the struggle for democracy built on the lives and blood of the patriotic students; never seek any excuse whatsoever for our own cowardice; never again allow our past humiliations to be repeated; never sell out our own conscience; never surrender to dictatorship; and never acknowledge the present last emperor of China as our lord and master.

On 30 May the students put up the famous Goddess of Democracy. On 3 June they inaugurated a Democracy University on Tiananmen, with Yan Jiaqi as its honorary president. Their vision was to invite people from all walks of life and all parts of China, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, to meet, teach, and learn about ideas of democracy, freedom, and reform in China. It would be a sort of New Culture Movement, a culturalist democratization campaign.

On the same night the 'emperor' sent in his troops. With tanks and machine guns, he displayed his displeasure by carrying out a ruthless massacre on Tiananmen Square, the gate of heavenly peace. Deng Xiaoping's massacre of the students, intellectuals, and other pro-democracy citizens of Beijing in 1989 outdid his imperial predecessor, the first Emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang, more than 2,000 years before, as well as the Beijing warlords just seventy years earlier. The intellectuals suffered much more than the most famous remonstrator in Chinese history, Qu Yuan, who lived two centuries before Qin Shi Huang.

In the aftermath of the massacre some of the June 4 student leaders and intellectual elite managed to flee China. Unfortunates, such as Bao Zunxin,

Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Ren Wanding, and Wang Dan, were arrested and after being in custody for more than a year, were hastily tried during the Gulf War and sentenced to long prison terms. Those in exile, under the leadership of Yan Jiaqi, Chen Yizi, Wan Runnan, and others, formed the Federation for a Democratic China in Paris on 22 August 1989. Its founding declaration says:

China's catastrophe demonstrates that, without the arousing democratic consciousness in all sectors of society, without the development of diverse independent political forces, and without a resilient and maturing democracy movement, it is unthinkable that this one-party regime will ever yield to democratic politics.

It goes on to say, 'The one-party system of autocracy has embedded in it evils that cannot be eradicated without destroying the system itself'. Yet it insists that the Federation is not a revolutionary party, not even a political party; rather, 'peace, reason, and non-violence are its criteria for action' (Han 1990:383-84).

Culturalist bondages

The most influential intellectual in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, Fang Lizhi, did not actually take part in the Tiananmen protest demonstration, but was on the most wanted list in the immediate aftermath of the June 4 massacre. He escaped arrest by going straight to the US embassy in Beijing to seek political asylum and stayed there until the 1991 Gulf War when the Chinese authorities finally allowed him and his wife to leave the country. Since then he has attended many functions staged by the Federation for a Democratic China and other Chinese pro-democracy organizations in the West, but has refused to join the Federation, in spite of heavy pressure put on him to lead the movement. He continued to insist that he would be involved in fighting for human rights in China, which he believed to be the most important issue facing the Chinese people. Again Fang has shown himself to be a cultural rather than an institutional democratizer, insisting that to change the socio-political psychology of the Chinese people was more important than to destroy the CCP one-party dictatorship and to build up an institutional democracy of two or more parties and fair and open elections. Like his most famous predecessor, Lu Xun, more than half a century ago, Fang in the end tried to liberate, modernize, and democratize the soul of the Chinese people, rather than to revolutionize and democratize the Chinese body politic.⁴

Two highly respected dissident intellectuals in China, Wang Ruowang and Qin Benli, publisher of the influential *World Economic Herald*, who had suffered severely in the past anti-intellectual campaigns, were in gaol or under house arrest for more than a year before they were released without trial in early 1991. They met each other in a Shanghai hospital shortly before Qin's death in April 1991. During their emotional reunion, Wang (1991:3–4) told Qin, 'The party will not desert you. You are the loyal son of the party'. Qin was pleased that Wang knew his 'second kind of loyalty', a remonstrator's loyalty, was strong. He said, 'It is not that the people are afraid of the government, but that the government is afraid of the people'. He advised Deng Xiaoping,

The country has no hope now. I only hope that Xiaoping will not do something that will make the enemy happy and the dear ones (the people) suffer pain again. He does not have much time left. He still has time to do a couple of good things. People will not forget.

Both Wang and Qin had made immeasurable contributions to China's liberalization and democratization in the 1980s. Wang's works on corruption and injustice under Mao, and Qin's unyielding support and publication of articles on economic, legal, and political reforms by Su Shaozhi, Yan Jiaqi, Fang Lizhi, Yu Haocheng, and others in his *Herald*, had enlightened tens of thousands of Chinese intellectuals. They had psycho-culturally democratized many Chinese minds and hearts. However, in the end they proved to be men of the May 4 Movement, of the 'New Cultural Renaissance', rather than functional-institutional democratizers, practitioners of democratic politics. In a more serious sense, they turned out to be quite traditional Chinese remonstrators, exact replicas of Qu Yuan.

Finally, after a three-year inhumane and technically illegal incarceration, in July 1992 Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang's chief political secretary, who was the mastermind of the political reform in the pre-4 June period, was put on trial on charge of inciting disorder and releasing state secrets (by warning the Tiananmen demonstrators of the planned troop movements under martial law) (Kaye:1992:10). As a scapegoat for Zhao Ziyang, he was hastily sentenced to a nine-year prison term. Both Yan Jiaqi and Chen Yizi worked under Bao during the reformist 1980s and regarded him as the most capable political reformer, not just a reformist theoretician but an effective political actor capable of pushing for institutional democratization. According to Yan and Chen, there were very few Bao Tongs in contemporary China.

Taiwan: The February 28 Uprising

28 February 1947 has to be the most dramatic and tragic day in contemporary Taiwanese history. On that day and over the following month, the Taiwanese socio-political intellectual elite rose up to reject their motherland, China. Having just loyally returned as long-lost sons after fifty years of colonial rule by the Japanese, they rebelled against the Nationalist government which they had just as warmly welcomed back as their 'Middle Kingdom' in 1945.

Although the whole story of the Uprising has yet to be told, there are a number of basic facts and aspects of the incident that have been generally accepted as part of an accurate picture of the incident.⁵ First, the Uprising was a rebellion against the corrupt, inept, and oppressive KMT government that was then being defeated on the Chinese mainland and driven to Taiwan. That government acted more like a colonial power than a father country receiving back with love and care 'an inseparable part of China' taken away in a war by an imperialist power half a century earlier. 'When Chinese Nationalist leaders sent military forces to Taiwan to accept the Japanese surrender, they failed to clarify in their minds whether they were dispatching armies of liberation or of occupation' (Jacobs 1990:104–8). Secondly, the rebellion was a rejection of the Middle Kingdom, a fight for self-determination and self-government, which later became increasingly a separatist campaign to attain an independent Taiwan. Since then, the Taiwan independence advocates have always used the February 28 Uprising as the spiritual inspiration, the ideological *raison d'etre*, of their movement. Thirdly, it was an uprising led by the intellectual elite, initially to repudiate the Nationalist regime; therefore it was a political act which turned gradually into a cultural and political rebellion against the traditional Chinese authoritarian social, political, and cultural systems. Fourthly, in consequence the intellectuals suffered most in the subsequent military suppression, a bloodbath bloodier than the June 4 Tiananmen massacre, carried out by Chiang Kai-shek's army. About 20,000 of the Taiwanese socio-political-cultural elite, most of them students and scholars, were summarily executed without trial or any other legal due process (Kerr:1965; Peng 1972; Cohen 1988; Lai *et al.* 1991; Executive Yuan 1992). Fifthly, it profoundly changed not only the political ecology of Taiwan, but also the cultural landscape (as in the area of Taiwanization of literature and art) and even the national psyche, for example in the emerging new Taiwanese nationalism (Chen 1982; Mendel 1970).

With Japanese institutionalism and legalism still having some impact on Taiwanese intellectuals, the lawless killing of people by the state in the February 28 incident shocked them into an awakening that the May 4, 'River Elegy' and June 4 generations of Chinese intellectuals never really encountered. In a way, the incident cleared the deck for the Taiwanese intellectuals who did not have to carry the weighty Confucian legacy of the Yellow River, the Dragon, and the Great Wall of China any longer. The February 28 massacre forced them to break out of the 'Middle Kingdom' syndrome, away from the yellow-earth 'Central Plain' culture. It forced them, over the next four decades, to go to Japan, to the United States and other Western capitalist democratic countries to seek cultural enlightenment and political emancipation.

The result was the creation of three generations of a much more utilitarian, legal-rationalistic, and institutional-democratic intellectual political elite, who became the forceful and successful economic and political modernizers of Taiwan. They did not pay much attention to the legacy of the May 4 cultural renaissance and the Chinese intellectuals' cries for anti-Confucian new cultural movement. Neither did they care much about the Maoist socialist-communist political and cultural revolutions. They were pragmatists, realists, and political activists who doggedly took part in painstaking political actions, organizing anti-KMT activities, forming anti-KMT organizations and, most importantly, contesting elections to win legislative seats and executive offices whenever and wherever they were held, in spite of great odds against them.

They were not great in number in the 1950s and 1960s, and under the 'white terror' of martial law, they could not get much popular support among the severely intimidated Taiwanese people. But the first generation of post-February-28 political dissidents maintained their anti-KMT democracy movement and tried to set up action-oriented political organizations. Their achievements were not very impressive but they were important in terms of sustaining opposition and establishing operational models for the following generations.

Before discussing the 1960 Lei Chen affair and the attempt to form the Chinese Democratic Party, it is necessary to point out again here that the cultural tradition of the May 4 Movement linked the political democratization processes in China and Taiwan, particularly in the 1950s, and especially through the intellectual leadership of Hu Shih. In 1949, on the eve of the collapse of the KMT government in China and the establishment of Mao's Communist empire on the mainland, a group of liberal democratic intellectuals led by Hu Shih, Lei Chen,

Hang Li-wu, and Wang Shi-chieh, most of them supporters if not members of the Nationalist Party, decided to form a 'third force' between the Communists and the Nationalists. True to their May 4 culturalist conviction, they wanted to save China and fight against Communist totalitarianism by 'publishing a political journal to advocate ideas of freedom and democracy to save the people's minds' (Lei 1978:48). Hu Shih named the journal *Free China* and declared that their goals were to propagate values of freedom and democracy, to fight Communist totalitarianism, and to make the Republic into a free China.

Initially, even Chiang Kai-shek gave tacit approval to the views expressed in the journal. In more ways than one, the journal was a continuation of the May 4 new cultural movement to advocate the ideas of Western democracy and to change the traditional Chinese authoritarian culture. In the early 1950s, that liberal image certainly helped to give the defeated KMT international standing as well as its internal unity. On the other hand, however, with the increasingly hardening authoritarian rule in Taiwan, the journal also began to play an increasingly critical role against the oppressive policy of the Nationalist government.

In October 1956 the journal published a special issue to 'commemorate Chiang Kai-shek's birthday'. The articles written by Hu Shih, Hsu Fu-kuan, T'ao Pai-chuan, Lei Chen, and others were clearly critical of Chiang's harsh personal dictatorship. They suggested that Chiang should find a successor, establish a cabinet system of government, nationalize the military, and learn from US President Eisenhower's 'non-action' style of government. The satirical attack on Chiang did not go down well with the conservative KMT hierarchy. The political department of the Ministry of Defence even issued a booklet calling *Free China's* thoughts poisonous. In late 1957, over a period of seven months, the journal published a series of articles entitled 'Today's Problems', in which some of its most scathing attacks were made by Yin Hai-kuang, a philosophy professor at National Taiwan University and a May 4 Westernizer.

Yin's articles criticized sharply the brutal authoritarian policies of the Chiang dynasty and attacked Chiang's application of emergency law. He condemned the generalissimo's saying that the KMT was the government and the KMT government was the nation. In short, he tried openly to destroy the myth and legitimacy of Chiang's 'mandate of heaven'. One of the articles in the series even openly advocates that Taiwan should have, and was ready to have,

an opposition party. It called for the immediate formation of a new political party: at the time, that was a total anathema to Chiang.

In addition to these culturalist activities centred around the *Free China* fortnightly, there was another political action in the making— Lei Chen's attempt to form an opposition party.⁶ That institutionalist democratic action was so anti-Chiang, anti-Chinese, and anti-Confucian in the eyes of the generalissimo that it totally exhausted his patience and brought his imperial rage on Lei and his followers. It also clearly separated the May 4 culturalist approach toward democratization exemplified by Hu Shih from the institutionalist approach led initially by Lei Chen and later by the Taiwanese oppositionists.

Lei Chen's efforts to form the Chinese Democratic Party involved a number of political as well as ideological-cultural changes. By 1960 Lei's liberal reformist group included quite a number of the Taiwanese intellectual political elite who had survived the February 28 incident, such as Li Wan-chu, Kuo Yu-hsin, Wu San-lien, and Kao Yu-shu.

A further political change was the increasingly competitive nature of local elections. As early as 1957, after the April elections of county-level executives and provincial assemblymen, Kuo Kuo-chi, Wu San-lien, Li Wan-chu, Kuo Yu-hsin, Li Yuan-chan, and Hsu Shi-hsien — the so-called 'five tigers' or 'four dragons and one phoenix' of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly — led a group of oppositionists in a seminar to discuss electioneering. At the seminar, Lei Chen made an impassioned speech calling for the formation of an opposition alliance. Subsequently Li Wan-chu, Wu San-lien, and seventy-six other participants formed a 'Chinese Local Self-Government Studies Association'. They applied twice for registration as a social organization and were rejected both times by the government. Nevertheless, supported by a *Free China* article that declared, 'Opposition party is the key to the solution of all problems in Taiwan' and by Li Wan-chu's newspaper, *Kung Luan Pao*, the opposition members continued to operate under different election-associated organizational names. When the 1960 elections were near, they organized an 'Election Reform Seminar' and began to advocate a new political party. In August, Lei Chen announced that the new party would be formed in September or October. On 1 September the 'Election Reform Seminar' put out an announcement declaring its intention to form a new political party on the basis of the 'patriotic need to check and balance the one-party dictatorship of the KMT'. On the same day, Yin Hai-kuang wrote a powerful editorial for *Free China*, saying, 'The great river is

flowing eastward. No one will be able to stop it'. Professor Yin was wrong. On 4 September the Taiwan Garrison Command arrested Lei Chen and Fu Cheng, editor of *Free China*, closed down the journal, and accused the two of insurrection.

There was an international uproar; Hu Shih and Carson Chang, the drafter of the 1947 ROC constitution, co-authored a letter to Chiang Kai-shek asking for Lei Chen's release, but to no avail. Lei was convicted of 'making propaganda for the Communist bandits' and 'knowing a Communist bandit but not reporting on him' and sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Lei was to serve his jail term in full while some of his followers were to serve a range of prison sentences. That effectively ended the first decade of limited attempts at the institutional democratization in Taiwan.

After Chiang had crushed *Free China's* democratizing push, Hu Shih retreated into his safe 'ivory tower'. Hu did give Lei Chen very strong moral support and discretely sought Chiang's leniency but he did not take any more organized action against Chiang's oppressive measures. Once again, as in the case of the May 4 Movement almost half a century earlier, Hu accepted culturalist determinism and could not effectively challenge Chiang's traditional Chinese paternalistic authoritarian power. Yin Hai-kuang continued to be defiant but only in the culturalist way. Although fiercely vocal and uncompromising, he was another Qu Yuan, a Chinese intellectual remonstrator, powerful with his pen but not really a political democratizer of action and organization. Unlike Yin, Hu Shih, who was perceived to be in a much stronger political position *vis-a-vis* Chiang and thus expected to be able to do much more, disappointed many people by not forcing the issue and leading the fight for the birth of the Chinese Democratic Party. Instead, he acquiesced in Chiang's action and accepted Chiang's offer to become the president of the Academia Sinica, the highest academic institution in the ROC. Yin suffered for his defiance but gained great respect and admiration among the Taiwanese people, especially the intellectuals (Wei 1990).

Hu and Yin were intellectuals of the May 4 tradition. Their political demise ended the last traces of the May 4 culturalist democracy movement, as well as attempts to forge some sort of mainlander-Taiwanese joint venture in democratizing Nationalist politics. It was a great pity that Chiang and his conservative

followers did not see the wisdom of letting Hu, Lei, and their Taiwanese intellectual comrades such as Li Wan-chu and other four ‘tigers’, form a viable opposition party to wash the February 28 blood stains from their hands and start a real democratization process in Taiwan. The lost opportunity not only ended any meaningful democratization chance in Taiwan for the next decade; more seriously it also ended any possibility of reconciliation between the Taiwanese and mainlanders, of bridging the painful gap between the two groups of people caused by the February 28 Uprising. If the February 28 massacre had pushed many Taiwanese into the irreversible separatist Taiwan Independence path, the Lei Chen or *Free China* affair further alienated the Taiwanese people and made them even more committed to the independence cause. The affair further radicalized and Taiwanized the anti-KMT forces and its impact has continued to be felt to the present time.

Elections and parties

The famous ‘five tigers’ and other post-February-28 Taiwanese intellectual democratizers gained their political power and legitimacy not through their intellectual prowess and achievements as had their May 4 culturalist counterparts in China, but through their continuous participation and victories in local elections. After 1949 Chiang Kai-shek learned some lessons from his defeat on the mainland, carrying out land reform and holding limited elections below the provincial level to present some facade of democratic reform to pacify his critics internally and externally. Jacobs (1991:17) points out that the Nationalist political system seems to have two obvious paradoxes. First, despite its projection of a strong conservative, anti-Communist image externally, the Nationalist system has implemented progressive social policies. Secondly, the Nationalist system has simultaneously incorporated elements of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘Leninist authoritarianism’. He believes the latter paradox led the KMT to subject itself to relatively free elections in which its nominees have lost with surprising frequency. As will be argued below, initially it was not such a paradox. The Nationalist Party was an authoritarian Confucian-Leninist party. In the 1950s and 1960s the elections were confined to below county (*hsien*)-city level, where the outcomes would not alter the power structure of the KMT regime at all. More importantly, in those earlier decades the elections were not really that free and

fair, and rigging was widely practised. It was in the 1970s, with the elections extended to the national parliament, and with increasing oppositionist *tangwai* (literally outside the KMT) pressures, that the elections became freer and fairer and the ruling party began to lose more seats.

It was in these local elections that the Taiwanese political elite, such as Kao Yu-shu and Kuo Yu-hsin, were able to accumulate political resources and build up a power base that would facilitate their pro-democracy political activities and at times protect them from persecution by the KMT government. Bearing a heavy Confucian scholar-official tradition, the Nationalists were more reluctant to persecute and imprison elected officials than powerless intellectuals. Thus, in Taiwan, election times were called 'political holidays', or 'democratic holidays', because candidates could ignore some of the restrictions of martial law, debate sacred cow issues, and criticize some of the policies of the Nationalist government. If elected, the candidates could also escape persecution for the indiscretions they had committed during the election campaigns; if they lost, however, they had better prepare for a stint in prison for a couple of years, a *modus operandi* by which the KMT has continued to deal with political dissidents in Taiwan.

As a consequence, elections have become a very important institutional democratization process in Taiwan. In the 1950s and 1960s the opposition group led by the 'five tigers' constantly won elections and maintained a meaningful, though party-less, institutional base to fight for increasing liberalization and democratization in Taiwan. They were the predecessors of the *tangwai* movement in the 1970s and the 1980s and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the late 1980s and 1990s. In the 1961 county-level elections, the 'five tigers' managed to lead their supporters to win about 20 per cent of the votes. That percentage was maintained by the opposition in the 1960s and 1970s, and increased to just below 30 per cent in the 1980s, in spite of the iron-fist control and overwhelming domination of the KMT in economic, political, social, and other fields in Taiwan. To win elections thus literally meant political survival for the dissidents and their democratization campaigns in Taiwan. To win elections also meant that the oppositionist democratizers in Taiwan had to group together to form some sort of institutional base, some sort of action-oriented organization. The reality of politics in Taiwan was that they had to become institutional, rather than just cultural, political activists; they had to push for the

establishment of political parties, in spite of the ban against doing so imposed by the 1949 martial law.

It is doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek and his Confucian conservatives foresaw these developmental, even democratizing, consequences. In 1969, when the KMT was forced to extend elections to the national level due to the rapid decline in the number of members of the continuing parliament, the opposition movement's scope was further expanded to reach the central government institutions. Almost inevitably, the elections led eventually to the illegal formation of the DPP on 28 September 1986 (see below) and to the great leap forward toward institutional democracy in the following years.

In the 1969 local elections, a totally unknown young gas station attendant, Kang Ning-hsiang, surprised everyone by winning a Taipei Municipal Council seat. The following year, in the first supplementary (*tseng pu*) national elections for the three houses of the parliament, another relatively unknown Taipei politician, Huang Hsin-chieh, won a seat in the Legislative Yuan. In the 1972 additional (*tseng e*) parliamentary elections, Kang won a seat in the Legislative Yuan. Subsequently, Huang and Kang, with other opposition members such as Huang Shun-hsiang and Hsu Shih-hsuan, have led the anti-KMT *tangwai* movement successfully to the present, in spite of the fact that Huang Hsin-chieh and many others were involved in the 1979 Kaohsiung incident and imprisoned for a long period. Huang Hsin-chieh, after having served nine years of his fifteen-year prison term, was pardoned and released by President Lee Teng-hui in 1989 and became the third chairman of the DPP, for three years from 1989-1991.

In 1973, a former KMT cadre, Chang Chun-hung, disenchanted with the Nationalist government, left the ruling party. He stood unsuccessfully in the Taipei Municipal Council election, but with another ex-KMT member, Hsu Hsin-liang, became a powerful force in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly in the mid 1970s. Both were renowned for their published works. Hsu caused the violent Chungli incident in the 1977 elections and won the chief magistrate's position in Taoyuan county. Both were involved in the Kaohsiung incident (see below) after which Hsu was exiled in the United States for about ten years while Chang, with Huang Hsin-chieh, was in prison for about eight years. Hsu and Chang have been two of the most effective and influential leaders in the *tangwai*

and DPP ever since. Chang was to serve two consecutive terms as the DPP secretary general, whilst Hsu became the fourth chairman of the party.

In the controversial 1977 elections, featuring the first massive anti-KMT riot since 1947 (the so-called Chungli incident), the *tangwai* won an impressive five out of twenty-one county-city chief executive seats. In addition, twenty-one oppositionists won Taiwan Provincial Assembly seats and eight won Taipei Municipal Council seats. Overall, it was a remarkable accomplishment by a group of unorganized political dissidents. Not only did they win elections; more importantly they forced the KMT to back down in the Chungli incident, and the second most powerful politician in Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo's right-hand man, Lee Huan, then the KMT organization head, had to resign.

The Kaohsiung incident two years later saw more than sixty *tangwai* leaders gaoled. Still, incredibly, in the 1980 national and 1981 local elections, the wives, brothers, sisters, and defence lawyers of the Kaohsiung defendants again triumphed under most difficult political circumstances. New stars, such as Chiang P'eng-chien, You Ch'ing, Hsieh Chang-t'ing, and Ch'en Shui-pien, emerged from nowhere to win and to become top leaders of the *tangwai* and eventually the DPP. Under this new leadership, the *tangwai* performed very well in both the 1983 and 1985 elections.

The 1986 and 1989 elections were most remarkable. The 1986 parliamentary elections were the first test of the illegally formed DPP. The party had been hastily formed in late September and the elections were held in early December while the DPP was still officially illegitimate under martial law. They were chaotic elections with the KMT's patience stretched to extreme limits and great pressure put on the government to crack down on the DPP campaign activities, many of them illegal according to the electoral and martial law regulations. Nevertheless, the elections were successfully held and the DPP won the day, not in the number of votes but rather in the struggles and successes of political institutionalization. They had firmly established themselves to be the only viable, meaningful opposition party in Taiwan. They won about 25 per cent of the votes, thirteen out of seventy-four Legislative Yuan seats and thirteen out of ninety-one National Assembly positions. Moreover, the victories by You Ch'ing, Kang Ning-hsiang, Chu Kao-cheng, Chou Ch'ing-yu (wife of Yao Chia-wen), Hung Ch'i-chang, Hsu Kuo-t'ai (Hsu Hsin-liang's younger brother), and Hsu Jung-shu (wife of Chang Chun-hung) were very impressive. They were the top or the second highest vote getters in their respective districts. The victories

of Wang Ts'ung-sung, Hsu Mei-ying, and Wu Che-lang, the former two representing labour and the latter business, two professional organizations that were traditionally under the KMT's iron-fist control, were nothing short of miraculous. After the elections on 7 and 8 December, the *New York Times* reported the DPP victories on its front pages, while Japan's *Yomiuri Shimbun* in its December 9 editorial commented:

In these elections, the DPP gained a lot of people's support, indicating that from now on, both internally and externally, Taiwan is going to turn into a totally new face. The formation of the DPP, its formal entering on the electoral stage, and marching toward democratization ought to be regarded as the beginning of the age of party politics in Taiwan.

If the 1986 elections were the solid beginning of democratic party politics in Taiwan, after a short period of three years, an even more solid, mature and effective performance by a two-party political system was evidenced at the 1989 elections. They were heatedly, even bitterly, contested elections. In statistical terms, looking at all three elections, the KMT for the first time won less than 60 per cent of the votes, a drop of about 10 per cent from previous elections, whilst the DPP gained nearly 30 per cent of the votes, an increase of about 5 per cent from previous elections. If some nonpartisan winners, such as Chang Po-ya, her sister Chang Wen-ying, and Ch'en Ting-nan, who had consistently sided with *tangwai* and DPP in the past, are counted as part of the overall anti-KMT oppositionist camp, the opposition would have won about 35 per cent of the total votes. Compared with their previous 25 per cent, the 1989 results were remarkable indeed.

Most significantly, in the important county-city chief executive races, out of twenty-one positions the DPP won six, with more than 38 per cent of the votes. With Chang Wen-ying (who won Chiayi magistrateship), the opposition would have won about 40 per cent of the votes. In a Taiwan immediately after the lifting of martial law and still under rigid control of the temporary provisions during the period of the 'anti-Communist campaign', this was a massive victory. You Ching's winning the Taipei county magistrate contest, which was called the 'great war of the century' and a 'must win' battle for the KMT (Taipei county is the largest local authority with more than three million population and the home county of President Lee Teng-hui), was so shocking to the ruling party that rumours spread in the early hours of 3 December that a military coup was contemplated by some of the diehard Nationalist conservatives. In addition, the

victories of Chou Ch'ing-yu in Changhua, Su Chen-chang in Pingtung, and Yu-Ch'en Yueh-ying in Kaohsiung county were remarkable in their own way.

The twenty-two DPP and some nonpartisan seats won in the Legislative Yuan were especially significant in that they enabled the opposition for the first time to propose bills and nominate for committee membership. In the early 1970s the KMT totally ignored the existence of Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsin-chieh in the Legislative Yuan. In the 1990s, they could no longer take lightly Hsieh Chang-t'ing, Ch'en Shui-pien, Yeh Chu-lan (wife of Cheng Nan-jung who burnt himself to death in 1988 to protest the KMT's persecution of the press and the opposition) and others. Despite the disparity in numbers, the DPP and nonpartisan members were able to put up more credible resistance and force the KMT to make concessions in legislative and other political matters.

Most foreign observers, such as US Congressman Stephan Solarz, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, praised the fairness and the outcome of the elections (Ts'ai and Myers 1990). The authoritative *The Journalist* (No.143, 19 December 1989), declared 'Long Live the Voters' and 'the Greatest Setback by the KMT'. Kang Ning-hsiang's *The Capital Morning Post* (3 December 1989) with coloured pictures of You Ch'ing and other six DPP and nonpartisan magistrates on the front page, announced, 'In the first post-martial law elections, the KMT has suffered unprecedented defeat. With the wins of the New Nation Alliance (which openly, though still illegally, supported Taiwan independence), the demand for Taiwan independence has gained wide electoral support'. The conservative *United Daily News*, which is run by Wang T'i-wu, a KMT old guard, admitted on the following day (3 December 1989), 'The ruling party lost in seven counties and cities. That was the greatest defeat in the last forty years. The voters used election ballots to tell the ruling party to reform. New leadership, new thinking, and new approach must be the new challenges to the ruling party'. Even the Beijing regime commented, 'In the elections, the DPP achieved great developments, whereas the KMT suffered unprecedented setbacks' (Ts'ai and Myers 1990:377).

Of course, in terms of real democratization in Taiwan these elections were not so important as to warrant such high praise. Even after the elections, with 101 newly-elected members in the Legislative Yuan, there were still in 1989 about 200 old, life-tenured legislators who had been elected to their seats in 1947. However, the old were dying out whilst the new were taking over. The newly-elected representatives of the people, with their people-based constitutional

legitimacy and power in the emerging two-party system, were to function increasingly effectively and to force the old guard rapidly off the central legislative stage. The most important point about these elections was that they had irreversibly advanced the birth of a two-party political system, which would inevitably lead to even more substantive institutionalist democratization and the eventual birth of true democracy in Taiwan.

Institutionalizing the tangwai

Probably more unintentionally than intentionally, the KMT allowed the local elections of the 1950s to expand slowly but steadily into national elections in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in increasing democratization of the political system in Taiwan. One aspect of the political system was the two-party polity that emerged from three decades of elections. Elections and the development of the party system have gone hand in hand in Taiwan's political development; it seems obvious that the two institutions have been closely linked. Probably more by historic accident than by purposeful design, the oppositionist democracy movement in Taiwan has since 1947 taken the firm institutionalist path, in sharp contrast with the culturalist road trodden by the Chinese democratic reformers.

In 1968, just as Richard Nixon became the American president, Chiang Ching-kuo became the ROC's minister of defence and began to emerge as the new strongman in Taiwan. In July 1971 when Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, secretly visited Beijing and worked out an agreement with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, Chiang Ching-kuo was aware of the pending change in fortune of the ROC and as a consequence was forced to carry out a series of *ke-hsin pao-tai* (reform to protect Taiwan) policies. In late 1971 when the PRC was admitted to and the ROC excluded from the United Nations, the KMT government faced its severest test since the Nationalists' defeat in 1949. Chiang Ching-kuo sought reformist ideas and support from the new generation of Taiwanese intellectuals, many of whom had studied abroad, mostly in the United States.

Initially this group of new, predominantly Westernized liberal democratic intellectuals gathered around the reformist journal — *The Intellectual (Ta-hsueh tsa-chih)*. They numbered more than 100, including Professors Yang Kuo-shu, Hungdah Chiu, and Sun Chen (later the president of the National Taiwan University), and liberal scholars such as Chang Chun-hung and Hsu Hsin-liang. From 1971 to 1973 the journal published many reformist articles urging drastic

economic, political, and social policy changes, not merely cultural reforms. In addition to its articles, the journal also held seminars to publicize and propagate its authors' reformist views and policies. In October 1971, the same month in which the ROC was ousted from the United Nations, the journal put out a special issue on 'national affairs remonstrance' which was co-authored by fifteen scholars. The articles called for the democratization of the whole structure of the ROC political system. Another article in the same issue, by Ch'en Shao-t'ing, then president of the journal, advocated the complete re-election of the three chambers of the parliament. These were all very radical ideas at the time, and had a great impact on the leadership, as well as on the general public, in Taiwan (Li 1988:83-109).

However, it was not only in the cultural-intellectual area that these reformists began to have an impact on Taiwanese politics. More importantly, as described above, it was in the local and national elections, particularly after 1969, that reformist intellectuals such as Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang, and Chang Chun-hung departed from their earlier culturalist democratization campaign and entered the real world of practical politics. By contesting and winning elections, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, and later Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hung, and others, began to lead a different kind of political movement. Their *tangwai* movement was a more organized, more grassroots-based, and more mass-campaign-oriented opposition force than the *Free China* democracy movement. They were a totally new and different breed of political dissidents from their predecessors, such as the famous 'five tigers' of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. They came from the Taiwanese indigenous intellectual political elite educated in Western ideas, values, and economic, political, social, and educational systems. They had very little to do with China, and even less with the May 4 culturalist reform tradition. Most of them, also, had little understanding of or interest in the Maoist revolution in China. They were very much Westernized liberal democrats with a utilitarian pragmatist mentality.

Thus, from the very beginning, they took part in elections and made their political names by winning elections. They published a number of legal or illegal *tangwai* journals to break up the nearly total monopoly of mass media by the KMT. Under martial law, the opposition was not allowed to publish newspapers or to form political associations, especially political parties, but

they were allowed to publish journals and periodicals. Following *The Intellectual*, led by Huanghsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung, the *tangwai* have published an enormous number of weekly, fortnightly, and monthly journals (Chen 1982; Chiou 1986). Kang's five-issue *Taiwan Political Review* became an overnight success in mid 1975. It was so radical and militant in the eyes of the Nationalists at the time that the KMT hastily banned it in December 1975, accusing it of 'inciting insurrection'. One of its editors, Huang Hua, who had already been imprisoned for more than ten years in a previous 'treason' conviction, was put in gaol for another fifteen years on the same trumped-up charge. Such irrational and drastic action by the KMT showed how frightened the government was of the new oppositionist forces.

Through the *Taiwan Political Review*, and its suppression, the *tangwai* became an even more united and better organized opposition. After impressive wins in the 1977 elections, they were able to form a 'Taiwan *Tangwai* Elections Support Group' in October 1978, which was supposed to play a quasi-party role in the impending December elections. However, in December 1978 US President Carter announced that he would officially recognize the PRC on 1 January 1979, and thus forced Chiang Ching-kuo to cancel the elections. The *tangwai*, all geared up for the 1978 elections, were deeply frustrated by the cancellation. They believed that the KMT was worried about losing the elections and had seized on Carter's announcement as an excuse to call them off.

After having strongly protested against the cancellation of the elections, in 1979 the *tangwai* movement became more alienated and frustrated with the KMT and with 'the system', and thus became more radical and militant. It was a year that saw increasing political polarization, radicalization, and tension between the *tangwai* and the KMT, culminating in the disastrous 10 December Kaohsiung incident.⁷ In June 1979 Kang Ning-hsiang, with the able editorial assistance of Antonio Chang, later publisher of *The Journalist*, published *The Eighties*, and later *The Asian* and *The Current*, in an attempt to regroup the dissident intellectuals and maintain his moderate reformist campaign. Simultaneously, Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang, Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hung, and Shih Ming-t'e (who had just served a fifteen-year gaol term for 'treason'), together formed a new militant activist group and published the now notorious mass-movement-oriented *Formosa* monthly, which was to advocate much more radical anti-KMT stands and action.

In the extremely polarized and tense political atmosphere, the *Formosa* group quickly became the central organization of the *tangwai* movement. The monthly publication was much more than an oppositionist journal; it was in reality a quasi-political-party whose branches, called *fu-wu ch'u* (constituent service offices), and mass demonstrations spread like prairie fire throughout the island state. Its bold militant confrontationist tactics clearly troubled the KMT hierarchy, particularly the conservatives who held power after the purge of the liberals in the aftermath of the Chungli incident. The confrontations intensified in late 1979. On 10 December, to commemorate World Human Rights Day, the *Formosa* group staged a massive anti-KMT demonstration in the port city of Kaohsiung. The KMT leadership decided not to tolerate the challenge and sent large numbers of anti-riot troops to crush the demonstration. The resultant riot got out of control with both sides suffering some casualties. On 13 December security forces moved quickly to round up the *tangwai* leadership. Eight *Formosa* leaders — Huang hsin-chieh, Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Lu hsiu-lien, Shih Ming-t'e, Ch'en Chu, Lin Hung-hsuan, and Lin I-hsiung (whose mother and twin daughters were mysteriously murdered on 28 February 1980) were tried, convicted, and sentenced by the military court to long prison terms, ranging from Shih's life term and Huang's fourteen years to others' twelve years; more than sixty others were tried by the civil courts and sentenced to three to eight years.

The *Formosa* trials were the most serious political persecution since the February 28 Uprising (Kaplan 1981). Clearly, the harsh treatment of the *tangwai* opposition had very little to do with the Kaohsiung demonstration. The 1977 Chungli riot had been much more violent. It burnt down the police headquarters. Yet there had been no mass arrests and 'treason' trials, because there were elections and there was only one man, Hsu Hsin-liang, who was not an organized institutional threat to the KMT power. The *Formosa* affair was different. There was a mass organization, a political institution, with salient party characteristics offering a clear and credible threat to the authoritarian power of the ruling KMT, a Confucian-Leninist party. That the Nationalist government was not prepared to tolerate. Such was the case in the 1960 *Free China* incident and it was the same in the 1979 *Formosa* fiasco.

As the 1983 elections approached, the *tangwai* organized a 'Tangwai Editors and Writers' Association' and a 'Tangwai Central Support Group', which

functioned relatively effectively as quasi-party campaign organizations, illegal but tolerated by the authorities during the 'democratic holidays'. In May, led by Fei Hsi-ping, Chiang Peng-chien, and Chang Chun-hsiung (then members of the Legislative Yuan) You Ch'ing (then a member of the Control Yuan), and Hsieh Chang-t'ing (then Taipei city councillor), they formed the '*Tangwai* Public Officials' Public Policy Research Association'. Although there were no elections pending and the association was not allowed to be registered as a social organization, and thus was illegal, it was again tolerated by the KMT, despite occasional threats from the government that action would be taken to ban the association.

In spite of the favourable conditions for the *tangwai*, in the November 1985 and February 1986 local elections, lacking a fully functioning party organization, they were unable to capitalize on the KMT's misfortunes. The *tangwai* leadership made up their mind in late 1985 that they had to expand their policy research association, set up branches throughout the island state, and become a real political party, in practice, if not in name. Although troubled by a series of domestic and international crises, the KMT was not in the mood to give in and let the *tangwai* easily 'smuggle' itself into existence as a *bona fide* political party. Mediated by one of the most respected elder statesmen in Taiwan, T'ao Pai-chuan, a former member of the Control Yuan and a presidential advisor, and three of the most prominent liberal scholars, Professors Hu Fo, Yang Kuo-shu, and Li Hung-hsi of the National Taiwan University, the *tangwai* and KMT went into a series of 'dialogues' in late 1985 and early 1986.⁸ Using carrot-and-stick tactics, the KMT tried everything to talk the *tangwai* out of forming nation-wide quasi-party organizations.

By May 1986 the stalemate had become serious, with both sides threatening to cut off negotiations. The KMT threatened to carry out mass arrests if the *tangwai* went ahead to establish anything like a political party, while the *tangwai* held firm and insisted that they would not compromise on the extension of their public policy research association. As polarization and confrontation seemed inevitable, on 7 May, the 'old man', Chiang Ching-kuo himself, unexpectedly told the KMT Policy Committee that they should try to develop dialogues with people of all walks of life in society, based on sincerity and faithfulness, so that political harmony and the people's welfare could be maintained and preserved.

Incredibly, on 10 May, through the renewed mediation efforts of T'ao Pai-chuan and the professors, three KMT Policy Committee deputy secretaries hastily called another 'dialogue' meeting with You Ch'ing, Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsieh Chang-t'ing, and other *tangwai* leaders. The 10 May dialogue lasted five hours with the two sides very conscious that this was the last chance for reconciliation. In the end, they managed to hammer out a three-point agreement. The most important point was that the establishment of the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association and its branches should be allowed. However, they failed to agree on an alternative name for the association or to settle the question of official registration.

The 10 May dialogue did not really settle the issue. But on the same day the more radical *Formosa* faction, headed by Ch'en Shui-pien, Yen Chin-fu (later a Taipei city councillor) and other more radical members of the *tangwai*, ignoring the dialogue, announced that they had formed a Taipei branch of the association, the first in the nation. Also on the same day, the Taiwan Garrison Command, the chief administrator of martial law, banned Kang Ning-hsiang's *The Eighties* for the fourth time, again showing its martial law teeth to the *tangwai*. On 15 May the moderate Kang reacted by forming another branch of the association, calling it the 'capital branch' to differentiate it from the radicals' Taipei branch. Instantly, a chain reaction was triggered with new branches, some split off from existing branches, shooting up all over the island like bamboo shoots after rain.

The *tangwai* ranks were divided on the matter, but neither was the KMT's conservative faction amused. As the *tangwai* radicals accused Kang Ning-hsiang and other participants in the dialogue of making too many concessions to the Nationalists, the KMT conservatives were so frightened of the *tangwai* emerging as a legitimate political party that they carried out a series of criticism campaigns against their own representatives in the dialogue. KMT rightists even compared T'ao, Hu, Yang, and Li with the 'democratic' intellectuals of the 1940s, such as Luo Longji, Zhang Naiqi, and Shen Junru, who had 'sold out' to the Communists in 1947-48; they characterized the dialogue as a capitulationist farce. Clearly, this group of KMT old guard could not accept the *tangwai* as a legitimate political opposition.

By the time the second round of talks was supposed to take place on 24 May, both sides found that the initial euphoria created by the 10 May dialogue had

dissipated. Past differences, distrust, and antipathies had returned, and with the pressures from their own camps mounting they could no longer engage in meaningful give-and-take dialogues. Polarization again had set in and each side had to harden its stand. The 24 May dialogue ended without any agreement on the thorny issues of the *tangwai* association's name and the question of registration.

On 18 July the KMT sources indicated that they had run out of patience and that if no further contacts were made between the two sides the government would again apply the full weight of martial law to declare the *tangwai* organizations illegal and ban them (Chiou 1986:26–27).

In May, Hsu Hsin-liang, still in exile in the United States because of the Kaohsiung incident, declared in New York that he would organize a 'committee for the formation of the Taiwan Democratic Party'. He promised to launch the party in August and bring it back to Taiwan to take part in the coming elections. As the number one *tangwai* election campaign strategist, whose 1977 Chungli incident was still a nightmare to the Nationalists, Hsu's threat was not taken lightly either by the KMT or the then *tangwai* leaders in Taiwan. With the two sides in a dangerous confrontationist mode, the *tangwai* ranks, although seriously split, came to see an institutional political party as the only option if they were to have a political future.

The following month Kang Ning-hsiang's public policy branch produced a 'democracy timetable' in which Kang mapped out an agenda for the *tangwai*: (1) to form a new party in 1987; (2) to lift martial law in 1988; (3) to have a complete election of the parliament in 1989; (4) to directly elect the president in 1990; and (5) to seek peaceful coexistence with China across the Taiwan Straits in 1991. It was a very radical reformist timetable then, yet in some ways it anticipated political events that were going to unfold in the following years. However, Kang's plan to form an oppositionist party proved to be too cautious. In July, after it had become increasingly clear that the KMT was not going to give in to their demands, the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association secretly set up an 'action group' to plan the formation of the new party. The group included You Ch'ing, Hsieh Chang-t'ing, Huang Er-hsuan (a political science professor at Soochow University, who was sacked because of his anti-KMT views and who later became the first secretary general of the DPP), and six others. On 9 August Kang Ning-hsiang held a mass rally to explain why they had

to have a political party. After that a series of 'party formation' rallies, conferences, and seminars was held. On 25 August Hsieh Chang-t'ing proposed the name, the Democratic Progressive Party.

However, the conservatives in the KMT were equally adamant that the oppositionists should not be allowed to form a party. The threats from the minister of justice, the KMT central leadership, and other government officials were crystal clear: if the *tangwai* went ahead against martial law, they would immediately be arrested, tried, and put in gaol.

As the November elections were approaching, the *tangwai* were pressured by lack of time and the increasingly volatile political situation. While the two sides had become polarized, a war of nerves was also being waged between the two camps. On 19 September, Kang Ning-hsiang, You Ch'ing, Hsieh Chang-t'ing, and others invited *tangwai* representatives throughout the island state to consider the party formation proposal. A week later a second meeting was held and a proposal to form the party was drawn up. Sixteen people signed the proposal, which they planned to put to a national meeting of the *Tangwai* Elections Support Association in late September. When the meeting was convened, in the morning of 28 September (at the Grand Hotel built by Madame Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s as one of the most majestic landmarks in Taipei), more than 100 *tangwai* representatives immediately got into a procedural debate on the question of whether the party formation issue should be put on the agenda. You Ch'ing declared that the time was now right for the formation of the new party. *Tangwai* organizations, such as public policy and editors associations, had all done their homework and were ready to act, and they had come up with a well-prepared party programme and constitution and a list of party names. By noon the representatives had gone through the process of moving a motion but few of them thought it would be possible to form a new party immediately; they thought they were discussing a future action. But as the day dragged on the atmosphere became more and more heated, but also euphoric.

Then, at the evening session, Chu Kao-cheng, the most dynamic but also unpredictable of the young radicals, decided to act. He had recently received his PhD from West Germany but returned home to find that the KMT would not allow him to teach, and so had decided to throw his lot into oppositionist politics by contesting the November election for the Legislative Yuan. At the evening session he rose to say that since all the representatives who had signed the

proposal to form the new party were candidates for the coming elections, if they formed the party now and the KMT persecuted them, they should all refuse to contest the elections and let the KMT suffer the criticism and pressure which, he believed, would be unprecedented from international as well as overseas Chinese communities. He then proposed that they should not wait any longer but immediately change their strategy by founding the party then and there. You Ch'ing immediately stood up and proposed that the meeting declare the birth of the new party. It was a strange political phenomenon, for suddenly it seemed that all 100 of those present, certainly the most experienced oppositionists in Taiwan, forgot the dire consequences which their spontaneous action could entail. In more of a coup than a deliberate political decision, by midnight they had pushed through all formalities and brought about the premature birth of the first real opposition party in Taiwanese history (Li 1988:213–68).

By dawn the next day many people in Taiwan, including *tangwai* supporters, must have thought that the Grand Hotel theatrics was a brave but ill-considered and even dangerous action. Most participants went home to prepare for the rage of the KMT authoritarian power. They believed the KMT would not tolerate their defiant behaviour and would use martial law to pull such seeds — not even roots yet — from the ground and crush them just as they had done sixteen years before in the Lei Chen case.

For the next few days, Taiwan lay under a thick layer of uncertainty. On 30 September the KMT dialogue team met the three professors and desperately tried to salvage the situation. After the meeting, they declared that the KMT chairman, Chiang Ching-kuo, and the party centre had reiterated that their commitment to continuous dialogue with the *tangwai* to maintain the social harmony and to achieve democratic reform had not changed; that the nonpartisans' (the KMT disliked the use of '*tangwai*') illegal and radical activities would lead to social unrest and hamper the construction of a constitutional democracy, and thus should not be attempted; and that they should not misunderstand the government's determination to uphold the rule of law. With regard to the nonpartisans' announcement of the foundation of the 'Democratic Progressive Party', the professors proposed further dialogue to advance democracy and agreed to convey the proposal to the concerned authorities, 'if the nonpartisans would hold their party formation action at the preparatory stage'. To the KMT statement, the DPP replied,

First, our party welcome sincere dialogues; second, we hope the government will apply its power according to the constitution and not misuse it; third, our party maintains its freedom to form the party is its constitutional right and we are willing to compete equally with other parties to collectively advance our constitutional democracy (*China Times* 6 October 1986 [Chiang Ching-kuo]).

The impasse continued until early October, when after protracted consultation with high party officials and his personal advisors, Chiang Ching-kuo finally spoke out. He told a KMT central standing committee meeting,

Time is changing, circumstances are changing, and the tide is changing. To meet these changes, the ruling party must push reforms according to new ideas, new methods, and based on constitutional democracy. Only so will our party be able to move with the tide and to be with the people all the time (*ibid.*).

Two days later, he met the visiting publisher of the *Washington Post* and for the first time declared that the government would shortly lift the four-decade-long martial law (*Washington Post* 8 October 1986). With that, Chiang Ching-kuo, displaying a great deal of political wisdom and skill, resiled from a hard-line confrontationist stand, allowed the DPP to be legalized, and peacefully resolved one of the most serious political crises since the February 28 Uprising.

On 10 October, the DPP convened its first national congress and elected a compromise candidate, Chiang P'eng-chien, as its first chairman. Although the KMT was not happy with the DPP's taking action before the law could be changed to properly legalize the new party, the government did not take any retaliatory action. No matter how it is considered, after more than forty years of one-party — effectively one-man — authoritarian government, and with the Nationalists' century-old suspicion and refusal to accept any meaningful opposition parties, the sudden birth of the DPP was undoubtedly the most dramatic break from traditional Chinese Confucian authoritarian political behaviour; indeed it was the most important breakthrough in contemporary Chinese, as well as Taiwanese, political history. As Chou and Nathan put it, more mildly though just as accurately:

The reform undertaken in 1986 represents a fundamental change of course, moving toward what we would call democratizing reform. The formation of an opposition political party does not by itself make Taiwan a

pluralist democracy, but it is the most important single step that could have been taken in that direction (Chou and Nathan 1987:283).

If the founding of the DPP on 28 September 1986 was the first major breakthrough in Taiwanese political development, the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and succession of Lee Teng-hui on 13 January 1988, with the subsequent political crises and reforms which culminated in the 28 June 1990 National Affairs Conference (NAC), was undoubtedly the second most critical political change in contemporary Taiwanese politics (Feldman 1991; Moody 1992; Simon and Kau 1992). As the first Taiwanese ROC president, Lee's ascendancy over the KMT old guard was a painful and difficult process. It caused a series of political crises in the first half of 1990, from the March pro-democracy student demonstrations at the Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall (a mini-Tiananmen incident), which forced Lee to convene the June-July ANC to carry out substantive constitutional political reform, to the uproar caused by Lee's dumping of Premier Lee Huan and his appointment of Premier Hau Pei-ts'un, a controversial four-star general.

Lee survived the crises by skilfully manoeuvring the NAC and accepting the DPP, for the first time in ROC and Taiwan history, as a worthy 'loyal opposition'. For a week, in a quasi-constitutional operation, the DPP played a constructive institutional democratization role, played give-and-take political games with the ruling party, and forced the KMT to deal with them as a potentially viable alternative to the Nationalist government. Out of the NAC, in addition to reaching a consensus on constitutional reform (such as that the future ROC president should be directly elected by the people), a two-party system established itself on the Taiwanese political landscape.

From the perspective of democratizing Taiwan, the most important thing about the NAC was not the constitutional reformist outcome or the legitimization result for the Lee presidency, but the first appearance of an institutional arrangement for competitive political leadership. Although embryonic, a democratic two-party system had been firmly established. Thus the stage was set for the NAC to push for further institutionalist democratization in Taiwan. With Samuel Huntington's institutional variable having made its presence felt in Taiwanese politics, 'the great transition' from liberalization to democratization seemed finally to be in progress. No one was yet optimistic about its ultimate outcome. Nevertheless, with his declared commitment to serving only one term

and working for real democratic reforms, coupled with his immense popularity among the Taiwanese people, Lee Teng-hui was in a good position to start, if not finish, bringing about this long-awaited political miracle.⁹

Conclusion

Though they did not necessarily have Lucien Pye's (1988) persuasively sophisticated psycho-culturalist argument in mind, many Chinese intellectuals, both of the May 4 generation and among the contemporary June 4 'mandarin scholars and officials', have put forward the same reformist rationalization: that they have to get rid of the 2,000-year-old Yellow-River, yellow-earth, and yellow-dragon Confucian political culture before they can modernize and democratize the Chinese political system. More importantly, with the arrival of Marxism-Leninism, and particularly the perceived successful marriage of Confucianism and Leninism, the post-1949 Chinese intellectual political elite went one step further by accepting totally the invulnerability, impenetrability, and indestructibility of the dictatorship of the Communist Party in contemporary Chinese politics. If asked, why not a two- or multi-party system, why can Taiwan introduce such reform but China cannot, they would undoubtedly cite the omnipresent, and thus seemingly omnipotent, control of the CCP. Very few of them, apart from militant radicals such as Fu Shenqi, Wang Juntao, and Wei Jinsheng of the 1979 'Democracy Wall' generation, have believed competitive elections fought by viable opposition parties armed with freedom of the press would be possible in Dengist, still less in Maoist, China. Led by brilliant intellectuals like Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, Chen Yizi, and others, the moderate reformists tried very hard to reform the Chinese polity into a 'socialist democracy', to make the CCP internally more 'democratic', to have more competitive elections for and give more decision-making power to the people's congresses, and to separate as much as possible the structures and functions of socio-political systems between the party and the state, and between the party-state organs and other socio-economic units. But in the end this proved to be a futile exercise.

In China, there were people's periodicals; in Taiwan there were *tangwai* journals. These contributed to breaking the tight control of mass media by the CCP and KMT respectively, and to fighting for freedom of speech and the press. Whilst in China there were practically no 'authentic elections', in Taiwan there were meaningful, relatively open and fair, democratic elections which

were fought vigorously and relentlessly by the oppositionists. Taiwan's 1986 and 1989 elections in particular firmly established democratic elections as a permanent, effective, and integral part of its institutional arrangement for competitive struggle for political leadership. In the PRC, there was no institutionalized opposition seeking to gain, or even seize, political power from the CCP; in Taiwan, there were many organizational forces, from the February 28 Uprising to the DPP, whose sole purpose was to engage in politics with the KMT and wrestle power from it.

In China, it was culturalist democratization that most of the intellectuals, the mandarin scholars, the democracy activists, had chosen as a means of transforming the 2,000-year traditional Confucian society. They believed they had to change Chinese political culture before they could change Chinese political behaviour and system. They fought valiantly for freedom of the press, but only marginally for meaningful elections, and even less for true oppositionist parties and two- or multi-party systems. In the end, most of them had become, like Qu Yuan, Confucian scholar-remonstrators, who sought to reform the authoritarian system from within, to create democracy within a one-party, even one-man, dictatorship. They were thus doomed to failure.

In Taiwan, after the February 28 massacre (just as in Japan after its defeat in the Second World War) the Taiwanese intellectual political elite seem to have made a major break away from their counterparts, the May 4 generation intellectuals, on the Chinese mainland. From the *Free China* days, through the *Formosa* protests and demonstrations, eventually to the formation of the DPP and the convention of the NAC, it seems that apart from the fight for freedom of speech and the press, the Taiwanese oppositionists had been primarily, some even obsessively, occupied with the 'technical' questions of winning elections and struggling to break the Nationalist one-party control by forming an opposition party to wrestle power from the KMT. In the end, when the DPP was formed in September 1986 and then 'won' (in a moral rather than a electoral sense) the December 1986 and December 1989 elections, they had, from the 'technical' point of view, won their institutionalist democratization battle and brought Taiwan to the 'primary' stage of structural-functional democracy.

Thus, in the Schumpeterian 'technical' sense, the success of Taiwan's institutionalist democratization and the failure of China's culturalist democratization have produced two political systems, different in kind rather than just in degree (Metzger and Myers 1991; Metzger 1991). In this case, means and

goals do meet and become one. This is probably one of the most difficult things for Chinese Confucian mandarin scholars to comprehend and accept. To them, goals have to be elevated to the land of great virtues, while means are just means, not important and beneath them. Unless they change their attitude and become willing to deal with 'technical' institutional questions, rather than remaining stuck in their tight cultural strait jacket, they will probably continue running in their May 4–June 4 vicious circle. If so, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to attain real democratization in the Middle Kingdom.

Epilogue

In December 1991 elections were held in Taiwan to elect the second National Assembly, which was to carry out the next stage of constitutional amendment in accordance with the consensus reached at the NAC. The DPP tried to use the elections as a referendum on the sensitive and controversial issue of Taiwan independence. The attempt backfired and the DPP suffered an electoral setback, obtaining only about 24 per cent of the votes and less than a quarter of the total assembly seats; it thus was powerless to effect the constitutional amendment process. The KMT was able to make only minimum change to the antiquated 1947 constitution, with the DPP boycotting the National Assembly proceedings in early 1992. It was a disappointment to many reformists.

The failure of the DPP to perform better both in the National Assembly election and in the Assembly meeting created some doubts in people's minds about the imminence of a viable two-party system in Taiwan. Thus, in the early 1990s, whilst the KMT tried to 'Japanize' Taiwanese politics by fashioning itself after the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party which had been in power since 1955, the Taiwanese people were wondering how the DPP would perform in the important December 1992 Legislative Yuan elections.

Since this article was written in mid 1992, Deng Xiaoping, having been deeply shocked by the collapse of Soviet and East European communism, has been forced to accelerate economic reform and opening to the outside world, while rigidly maintaining his one-party dictatorship. Pressured by the West, especially the United States, Deng has also been more careful about the human rights record in China. Thus, Wang Dan and Bao Zunxin were released from prison, and Wang Ruowang and Wang Ruoshui were allowed to go to the United States to take up research fellowships at Harvard and Columbia universities.

Wang Ruowang was immediately persuaded by Liu Binyan, Yan Jiaqi and other pro-democracy activists to lead their movement in the West. It is expected that he will be elected to the chairmanship of the new alliance of the Federation for a Democratic China and the Alliance for Democracy in China. The merging of the two is to take place in early 1993. Since his departure from China, Wang Ruowang has been emphatic about the need for a meaningful opposition party in China. It seems he is going to lead the new pro-democracy organization along this institutionalist democratization line.

On the Taiwanese side, the second Legislative Yuan elections were finally carried out on 19 December 1992, with stunning results. For the first time since 1947, the whole house was up for re-election. After bitter and colourful campaigns and with some lingering doubts following the 1991 National Assembly elections, 72 per cent of the eligible voters turned out to elect the 161 new legislators. The KMT suffered the most serious setback in its four-decade rule, whilst the DPP achieved the most impressive result in the post-World War II Taiwanese oppositionist struggle. The KMT won 53 per cent of the popular vote, the lowest on record, while the DPP scored a record 31 per cent. With other pro-DPP candidates' votes added, the opposition won between 36 per cent and 40 per cent of the votes cast. The DPP gained fifty seats in the new parliament with two or three extra pro-DPP seats, nearly one third of the total seats in the house. The DPP has accomplished one of the principal tasks of an opposition party, that of becoming a constitutionally and institutionally viable alternative to the ruling party, something its Japanese counterpart, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (formerly Socialist Party of Japan), has not achieved in the last four decades.

The Economist (26 December 1992–8 January 1993) saw the elections as the beginning of a two-party system in Taiwan and suggested that the island state was breaking new political ground. *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (7 January 1993) described the polls as 'a stinging rebuke to the Kuomintang' and 'a victory for the democratic process', suggesting that 'the public prefers politicians who have distanced themselves from the factionalism and money scandals that have sullied the KMT's image during the past year'.

A *Newsweek* (21 December 1992) cover story, 'Pivotal Elections in Korea and Taiwan', recognized that the elections would enliven Asia's quest for democracy but asked: 'Is Taiwan a model for Asian democracy — or a case

study in how to manipulate the system?'. The elections demonstrated that institutionalist democratization had advanced much further than most people had expected. Taiwan is becoming a model for Asian democracy.

In December 1991 I was in Taiwan following the National Assembly elections. I was disappointed with the results and with the way the KMT used scare tactics and vote-buying during the campaign. However, I disagreed with the views that the DPP was not ready for power, that the Taiwanese people were not ready for the DPP, and that the institutional democratization process was seriously premature (Hsu and Chang 1992). During November–December 1992 I again travelled all over the island state to observe the elections, from Taipei, Tainan and Kaohsiung to Hualien and small villages and towns in central Taiwan. I was impressed by the enthusiasm and maturity of the voters. Many voters told me, 'Both KMT and DPP candidates are not very good, but we have to vote for the DPP, because we need them to check and balance the power of the ruling party'. That simple institutional democratic idea seems to have finally struck deep in the minds of the Taiwanese people.

Notes

- ¹ I had long interviews with Yan Jiaqi in October 1986. He talked a great deal about these local experiments in participatory democracy and was quite excited by them.
- ² In October–November 1988 I was in Beijing and was able to have many long conversations with Zhao Fusan, Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, Bao Zunxin, Zhang Binjiu and other neo-authoritarianists, and with the 'River Elegy' authors, Wang Luxiang, Yan Zuming and others.
- ³ Information on the June 4 incident is based primarily on Han Minzhu *Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (1990).
- ⁴ Fang Lizhi's refusal to lead the Federation for a Democratic China was expressed at the '1990 Democratic Man of the Year' award ceremony, sponsored by the Chinese Democratic Education Foundation, San Francisco, in March 1991. He again rejected the offer of leadership by Yan Jiaqi and Chen Yizi in October 1991 (see Chiou 1992: 82–85).
- ⁵ In early 1992 the Executive Yuan released its official investigation report on the February 28 incident. The report is fairly comprehensive but still leaves many questions unanswered. It is, however, a much better, and certainly more objective, treatment of the tragedy than that of Lai *et al.* (1991).

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- ⁶ For details of Lei Chen's attempt at party formation, see Li (1988). Li's book is also a useful reference on the *tangwai* movement.
- ⁷ Details of this period are based on my extensive interviews with the *tangwai* leaders in late December 1979 and early 1980, right after the Kaoshiung incident.
- ⁸ Information about the 'dialogues' and the sequence of events before and after the dialogues is based on my discussions with Kang Ning-hsian, You Ch'ing, Hu Fo, Li Hung-hsi and others in January 1986.
- ⁹ I attended the 1990 NAC and was deeply impressed by the proceedings of the pseudo-parliamentary exercise. For further details, see Chiou (forthcoming).
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